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CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION
ON THE INTERNET
TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN VISION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS:
REDEFINING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN A GLOBAL ERA
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN

†

It has now been ten years since the idea of global online communication first entered the popular consciousness. And while the
Internet has undoubtedly opened up new worlds of interaction and
cooperation across borders, this increased transnational activity has
also at times inspired parochialism, at least among the legislatures and
courts of nation-states around the globe. Thus, we have seen a slew of
national laws and court decisions purporting to regulate a wide variety
1
2
3
of online activities, from gambling to chat rooms to auction sites,

†
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1
See, e.g., Interactive Gambling Act, 2001, pts. 2 & 2A (Austl.) (prohibiting
online gambling services to customers in Australia and other designated countries), available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Legis/oldBills/
Linked/31070101.pdf; Humphrey ex rel. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d
715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation and its principal for deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud in connection with an Internet gambling site); Vacco ex rel. People v.
World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851-54 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (enforcing
state and federal laws to ban foreign corporation; its Antiguan subsidiary; and their
principals, officers, and directors from operating or offering gambling over the Internet).
2
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(l)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (requiring schools and libraries to
adopt and implement policies to ensure “the safety and security of minors when using . . . chat rooms”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.413 (2001) (restricting ownership and
use of online chat rooms by people previously convicted of cyber-stalking); Associated
Press, China Tightens Internet Censorship, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2000, at A20 (reporting
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and seeking to enforce territorially based rules regarding trademarks,
5
6
7
8
contractual relations, privacy norms, “indecent” content, and crime,

Chinese restrictions requiring chat rooms to allow only officially approved topics to be
discussed).
3
See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 26-2-8-101 to -302 (2001) (containing the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which facilitates the use of online auction sites by giving legal
effect to electronic signatures and contracts); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to -330 (2001)
(same); T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (enjoining Yahoo.com from permitting French users’ access to Nazi memorabilia via Yahoo!’s auction sites), available at http://www.
juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf. For further discussion of this case,
see infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
4
See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, and 28
U.S.C.) (providing for the “registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce”); Rachel Ross, China Demands Jurisdiction over Domain Names in Chinese,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 2000 (reporting that China is seeking to ensure that it controls the distribution and administration of all Chinese-character domain names).
5
See, e.g., Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Austl.) (creating a regulatory regime
intended to support and encourage business and consumer confidence in the use of
electronic commerce), available at http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3328/
top.htm; UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 200 (2002) (providing a
model uniform state law to govern online contracts), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/cita10st.doc.
6
See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2000)
(prohibiting unauthorized access to a “facility through which an electronic communication service is provided”); Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.) (requiring technical and organizational measures against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss of, destruction of, or damage to personal data),
available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029.htm (July 24, 1998).
7
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000) (prohibiting the receipt or distribution of
sexually explicit photos of minors by any means, including by computer); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, provisions of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1994), that criminalized certain content transmitted via online communication); ACLU v. Reno, 217
F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming, on First Amendment grounds, preliminary
injunction preventing the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §
231 (Supp. IV 1998), which also criminalized certain content sent via online communication), vacated and remanded sub nom. by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Regina v. Pecciarich, [1995] O.R.3d 748 (holding that the distribution of child pornography by uploading photos to an electronic bulletin board was in violation of criminal
statutes).
8
E.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (applying federal
law to newly discovered forms of computer abuse and providing civil remedies for certain types of computer crimes); Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23
(Eng.) (defining criminal penalties for interception of traffic on all postal and telecommunications networks and any action that may cause the content of a message to
become known to people other than the sender or intended recipient); Am. Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that defendants who harvested e-mail addresses of AOL members using an extractor program
and then used those addresses to send unauthorized bulk e-mail advertising their pornographic web sites were in violation of federal and state statutes).
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among others. These assertions of national authority have helped to
reawaken scholarly interest in the classic triumvirate of topics historically grouped together under the rubric of conflict of laws: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments.
9
In a previous article, I argued that territorially-based conceptions
of legal jurisdiction may no longer be adequate in an era when
ideas of bounded nation-state communities operating within fixed
territorial borders are under challenge. I offered instead what I called
a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction: cosmopolitan because it recognized the possibility that people can hold multiple,
sometimes nonterritorial, community affiliations; and pluralist because
it acknowledged that forms of legal (or quasi-legal) jurisdiction can be
asserted by communities beyond those represented by official statesanctioned courts.
This Essay turns the focus to choice of law and recognition of
judgments. Analyzing three recent U.S. cases (two involving choice of
law and one addressing recognition of judgments), I seek to apply
some of the principles of cosmopolitanism to consider how courts
should understand their institutional role in cases raising multinational concerns. (I leave to a future article the issue of how the insights of legal pluralism might inform conflict of laws.) The two
10
choice-of-law cases, GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com and Barce11
lona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, both concerned the application of U.S. trademark law to transnational Internet
domain name disputes. The third, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
12
Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme, addressed whether or not a French judgment about Internet content accessible in France should be recognized by a U.S. court. Significantly, in each of the three cases, the
judges failed even to conceive of the issues raised in conflicts terms.
Instead, they simply assumed that U.S. law should apply, and though
they included some bland statements about the importance of comity,
there was no sustained discussion in any of the three decisions concerning how the choice of governing legal norms should be made.
Thus, simply surfacing the way in which classic conflicts debates bear
on these cases may itself be useful. In addition, I believe a cosmopoli9

Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311
(2002).
10
250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
11
330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
12
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
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tan perspective might have altered the court’s approach (if not always
the result) in each case.
Taking seriously the observation that in conflicts scholarship there
13
is truly nothing new under the sun, the cosmopolitan perspective I
offer here does not purport to create a new theory of choice of law.
Instead, it combines aspects of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, as well as the three major choice-of-law regimes of the twentieth century—vested rights, governmental interests, and the substantive law method—to shape an overall attitude with which judges can
approach cases involving conflicting transnational legal norms. This
attitude starts from the idea that governments have an interest not
only in helping in-state litigants win the particular litigation at issue,
but a more important longer-term interest in being cooperative members of an international system and sharing in its reciprocal benefits
and burdens. Similarly, with regard to judgment recognition, the
cosmopolitan perspective asks judges to consider the independent
value of enforcing a foreign judgment, even when that judgment is
contrary to local policy choices. Moreover, the cosmopolitan approach focuses less on literal contacts with a territorially-based sovereign entity and more on the extent to which the various parties might
be deemed to have affiliations with the possible communities seeking
to impose their norms. Thus, while derived from various extant conflicts theories, the cosmopolitan perspective yields a distinctive approach, and one that I believe is better suited to a world of interconnection, interrelationship, and multiple community affiliations.
My discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I describe the three
cases, noting the ways in which each of the U.S. courts involved managed to discount the possibility of deferring to the actions of foreign
courts. Second, I briefly summarize the major twentieth-century
choice-of-law approaches and suggest a perspective that blends aspects
of all three (as well as the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law),
while also drawing on insights from the voluminous interdisciplinary
literature on cosmopolitanism. Third, I argue that in recognition of
judgments, as in choice of law, deference to foreign court judgments
might sometimes be an independent value, and I suggest that some of
the principles that govern the recognition of judgments in the domestic U.S. context might therefore also apply transnationally. Finally, I
return to the cases and discuss how the cosmopolitan perspective on
13

See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE
(1993) (arguing that each of the major twentieth-century conflicts theories had already
been propounded at some earlier point in history).
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choice of law and judgment recognition described in the previous sec14
tions might have affected the courts’ analyses. In conclusion, I suggest an ongoing research agenda for further refining and developing
a more comprehensive cosmopolitan approach. Certainly, as these
cases make clear, reconceptualizing the principles underlying courtto-court relations is essential in a world where the idea of a transnational community of courts is fast becoming one of the dominant re15
alities of twenty-first century law.
I. A PAROCHIAL VISION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS:
THREE CASE STUDIES
The three cases described in this section all take the view, explicitly or implicitly, that U.S. law must be applied to the transnational
dispute at issue. That, in and of itself, is not necessarily cause for concern, but it is striking that these courts do not even engage in traditional conflicts analysis to reach their conclusions. Instead, simply because U.S. law may apply, the judges seem to assume that U.S. law
should apply, even without any sustained discussion of other possible
outcomes. At most, there is some consideration of comity. But comity
is a weak analytical framework because it comes into play only as a discretionary restraining factor after the courts have already decided that
U.S. law applies. Comity analysis, therefore, is not sufficient to replace
a serious inquiry concerning the principles needed to determine
which legal rules should govern in the first place.
A. Choice of Law
1. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com
Historically, the boundaries of trademark law have been deline16
ated in part by reference to physical geography. Thus, if I own a
store in New York City called “Berman’s,” I will not, as a general mat14

Significantly, although one might ultimately agree with the final outcome in any
or all of these cases, the mode of analysis remains suspect.
15
See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 432 (2003) (“[I]n a world of global commerce and communications, national courts cannot avoid interactions with the larger world, and lawyers and scholars
cannot ignore the transnational aspects of modern litigation.”).
16
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law
from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887 (2004) (“[I]t is an axiomatic principle
of domestic and international trademark law that trademarks and trademark law are
territorial.”).
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ter, be able to prevent a person in Australia from opening a store that
is also called “Berman’s,” even if I have previously established a
trademark in my name. The idea is that customers would be unlikely
to confuse the two stores because they are in markets that are spatially
17
distinct. In the online world such clear spatial boundaries are collapsed because, as the domain name system is currently organized,
there can be only one bermans.com domain name, and it can only
18
point to one “location.”
In the early to mid-1990s, as corporations and entrepreneurs began to understand the potential value of a recognizable domain name,
pressure increased to create trademark rights in such names. In re19
sponse, Congress first passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
and then the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),
which provides an explicit federal remedy to combat so-called “cyber20
squatting.”
According to the congressional reports, the ACPA is
meant to address cases where non-trademark holders register wellknown trademarks as domain names and then try to “ransom” the
21
names back to the trademark owners.
Nevertheless, even if one believes that reining in “cybersquatters”
22
is a laudable goal (and that goal itself has been questioned), there

17

See Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916) (“[W]here two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in
separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant . . . [except in cases of bad faith].”). This is not an absolute rule, of course, because “famous or well-known marks may well leap oceans and
rivers, cross national borders, and span language barriers to achieve international recognition.” Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 695, 720 (1998). See also Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 332
(Sup. Ct. 1959) (enjoining the use by a restaurant in New York of the name and decor
of Maxim’s Restaurant in Paris). Nevertheless, the likelihood-of-confusion standard
historically has tended to imbed a geographical limitation.
18
Of course, users going to www.bermans.com could be shown an introductory
screen that provides a choice of which Berman’s site they wish to access.
19
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (Supp. 1996)).
20
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113
Stat. 1501A-545, 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)); see H.R.
REP. NO. 106-412 (1999) (detailing the Act).
21
See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5-7 (1999) (noting that “[s]ometimes these pirates
put pornographic materials on theses sights [sic] in an effort to increase the likelihood
of collecting ransom by damaging the integrity of a [trade]mark”); S. REP. NO. 106140, at 4-7 (1999) (highlighting testimony regarding attempts to ransom domain
names to the highest bidder).
22
For example, Yochai Benkler has argued that the strong protection of trademarks in domain names has “maintain[ed] the value of brand names at the expense of
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can be little doubt that the application of trademark law to domain
names has meant that trademark law has become unmoored to physical geography and is now more likely to operate extraterritorially. Potentially, even those who are legitimately using a website that happens
to bear the name of a famous mark held by an entity across the globe
23
could be forced to relinquish the name. In addition, this unmooring

the efficiency of electronic commerce.” Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock
and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2000). According to Benkler,
the current approach assumes that consumers will, for the foreseeable future, seek out
websites primarily by typing into their browser a uniform resource locator (URL) such
as http://www.brandname.com, rather than by using search engines or product review
sites. This assumption is then employed to justify permitting the owner of the trademark in a brand name to control use of that brand name in a URL. Id. at 1256-57.
Such a legal determination, however, does not just assume a static model for the digital
environment where customer habits, browser configurations, and search engines will
continue as they are, but also enforces such a static model backed by the power of law.
Id. at 1257. As Benkler points out:
The private stakes for those corporations who have invested in building brand
recognition and plan to recoup their investments by exercising some price
discipline using the value of their brand name as a search-cost saving device
for consumers are obvious. The public benefits of protecting these costs by
encouraging consumers not to take advantage of the reduced search costs in
the electronic commerce environment are more questionable.
Id. He suggests that we might instead “accept the declining importance of trademarks
[in the digital environment,] . . . limit legal protection to situations where competitors
try to use a mark to confuse consumers, and . . . abandon the notion of dilution as protection of goodwill, which developed to protect the famous marks most useful in the
old environment.” Id. at 1249; cf. Manchester Airport PLC v. Club Club Ltd., Case No.
D2000-0638, World Intellectual Property Org. [WIPO] Arbitration and Mediation Ctr.
Admin. Panel Decision (Aug. 22, 2000), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0638.html (stating that respondent attempted to sell the
domain name to the complainant “for an amount well in excess of the registration
fees,” but noting that “selling a domain name is not per se prohibited by the ICANN
[Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers] Policy (nor is it illegal or
even, in a capitalist system, ethically reprehensible)”).
23
In response to this problem, the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property adopted, in
the fall of 2001, a Joint Recommendation calling for a definition of “use” for purposes
of trademark law that would protect legitimate users of marks who disclaimed any
intent to engage in commerce in a particular country. Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property
Rights in Signs on the Internet art. 2 (2001), at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/
development_iplaw/doc/pub845.doc. The ACPA at first glance seems to limit its extraterritorial scope in a similar way because it extends in rem jurisdiction only if the
domain name violates rights protected by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(a),
which in turn requires that a mark be used “in commerce.” See Dinwoodie, supra note
16, at 909. See also id. at 909 n.85 (explaining that this requirement has been widely
accepted by judges despite the lack of an explicit statutory basis). Presumably this “use
in commerce” requirement means that the mark must actually be used in the U.S.
market to give rise to a cause of action. However, because a website located abroad
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of trademarks from territory creates the possibility that individual
countries will interpret their trademark laws expansively, thereby reducing trademark rights “to their most destructive form”: the mutual
ability to block (or at least interfere with) the online use of marks rec24
ognized in other countries. Moreover, each of the parties claiming
ownership in a trademark could sue in a different country, and, be25
cause of differences in substantive law, each party could win.
26
This is the backdrop for GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com.
On September 3, 2001, Global Marine, Inc. and Santa Fe International Corporation announced their agreement to merge into an en27
tity to be known as GlobalSantaFe Corporation. Less than a day
later, Jongsun Park, a citizen of South Korea, registered the domain
name globalsantafe.com with the Korean domain name registrar
28
Hangang. In response, Global Marine and Santa Fe filed an in rem
29
action in the Eastern District of Virginia under the ACPA.
The
ACPA provides in rem jurisdiction over a domain name wherever that
30
name is registered. Thus, for example, if people register domain

may render services to customers in the United States, it is unclear whether the “use in
commerce” requirement will in practice provide much of a limitation on the potentially extraterritorial application of the in rem provisions. See, e.g., International Bancorp, LLC v. Société des Bains de Mer, 329 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling that
providing services abroad to U.S. customers can constitute “use in commerce” for purposes of the Act). For a discussion of this case, see Dinwoodie, supra note 16, at 91419.
24
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of
Trademarks 27, Presented at the WIPO Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property (Jan. 30-31, 2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 2001) (noting
that “[t]his ‘mutual blocking’ capacity is neither efficient nor a positive contribution to
the globalization of markets or the development of ecommerce”), available at http://
www.wipo.org/pil-forum/en/documents/doc/pil_01_4.doc. Catherine T. Struve and
R. Polk Wagner have also raised the specter that realspace sovereigns may increasingly
attempt to segment the domain system itself, to insure that any trademark action involving domain names will have the requisite territorial nexus to support the assertion
of jurisdiction. Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989,
1031-34 (2002). As Struve and Wagner point out, such territorially based segmentation
of the domain name system would result in “the dramatic reduction in utility provided
by the system itself.” Id. at 1031.
25
See, e.g., Mecklermedia Corp. v. D.C. Cong. GmbH, 1998 Ch. 40, 53 (Eng.) (noting that the cause of action for using trademarked language is different in Germany
and England and, thus, simultaneous proceedings could continue).
26
250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
27
Id. at 613.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C) (2000) (“In an in rem action . . . a domain name
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names online via a website owned by Network Solutions, a domain
31
name registrar corporation located in Virginia, they potentially can
be forced, under the ACPA, to defend a trademark action in Virginia
whether or not they have ever set foot in Virginia or knew Network Solutions was a Virginia corporation.
In this case, however, jurisdiction was further complicated by the
fact that Park had not even registered the domain name with a U.S.
registrar, but with a South Korean one. Nevertheless, the ACPA also
authorizes in rem jurisdiction in the judicial district where the overall
32
domain name registry is located. Based on this provision, the district
court determined that it could exercise jurisdiction because VeriSign,
33
which administers the entire “.com” registry, is located in Virginia.
And, having determined that the substantive provisions of the ACPA
had been met, the court therefore ordered both Hangang and
VeriSign to “take all appropriate steps to transfer the domain name”
34
to GlobalSantaFe.
Approximately a week later, Park filed an application for an injunction in the District Court of Seoul, South Korea, seeking an order
35
preventing Hangang from transferring the domain name. Ruling
that the Virginia court did not have proper jurisdiction, the Korean
court provisionally granted the injunction, and Hangang, presumably
responding to the Korean court’s injunction, subsequently refused to
36
transfer the domain name. In an effort to resolve this transnational
stalemate, GlobalSantaFe returned to the court in Virginia seeking an

shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which . . . the domain name
registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located . . . .”).
31
A registrar is one of several entities for a given top-level domain (such as .com,
.edu, .gov, .uk, etc.) that is authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers to grant registration of domain names. DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW
§ 3D.05[3], at 3D-104 (2002).
32
See supra note 30. For each top-level domain (such as .com, .gov, .edu, .uk, etc.),
a single registry company is responsible for keeping the records and a directory of all
the domain names within that domain. When an individual or corporation company
wants the rights to a new domain name, it contacts a registrar. The registrar submits
the domain name to the registry, which enters the assigned domain name into a database. Currently, VeriSign Global Registry Services is the sole registry for “.com” domain names.
33
GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15.
34
Id. at 614.
35
Id.
36
Id.

1828

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 1819

additional order directing VeriSign to cancel the infringing domain
37
name from the “.com” registry.
The District Court reaffirmed that it had proper in rem jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the ACPA because VeriSign is located in
38
Virginia. The court also reiterated that Park had violated the sub39
stantive provisions of the ACPA. And, after a lengthy discussion of
the mechanics concerning how a registry company would effectively
40
cancel or transfer a domain name, the court concluded that such a
remedy was both available under the ACPA and appropriate given the
unwillingness of Hangang to act in violation of the Korean court’s or41
der.
From a conflicts perspective, what is most striking about the decision is that the court focuses almost exclusively on its jurisdiction to
hear the case, but never questions that the ACPA is the only possibly
relevant legal regime. Indeed, the court seems to assume that the
ACPA’s legal reach is limited solely by the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, not by any choice-of-law considerations. Thus, in the court’s
view, the only significant gap in the ACPA’s trademark enforcement
regime is for domain names registered under top-level domains whose
registry is located outside the United States. Never does it seem to occur to the court that, even if it had jurisdiction over the action, it
might nevertheless choose South Korean (or some other) law as providing the operative legal norms for resolving the dispute.
This single-minded focus on jurisdiction (and therefore the physical location of registry companies) poses potential problems for ACPA
enforcement in the future. As the court recognizes, if jurisdiction is
all, then the ACPA can only provide a broad-based remedy in domain
name trademark cases so long as the registries of the most popular
42
top-level domains remain in the United States. Thus, if country-code
top-level domains were to become more popular, or if the registries
for generic domains such as “.com” and “.net” were relocated outside
the physical territory of the United States, then U.S. trademark rights
43
in domain names would face serious enforcement challenges. Such

37

Id.
Id. at 614-15.
39
Id. at 615-16.
40
Id. at 617-24.
41
Id. at 623.
42
Id.
43
See Struve & Wagner, supra note 24, at 1019-41 (warning that aggressive assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over the domain name system may ultimately lead to the sys38
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difficulties are a natural consequence of laws that are deemed to apply
to the full extent of their territorially-based jurisdictional reach. But,
of course, as choice-of-law scholars have long recognized, laws need
not be applied to the full extent of their jurisdictional reach, and concerns about the establishment of competing or conflicting trademark
systems on the Internet are precisely the sorts of concerns that might
animate a more restrained application of forum law.
In any event, having concluded that the case was within its jurisdiction and that, therefore, U.S. law necessarily applied, the court
only at the very end of its opinion asked whether “concerns of international comity” might dictate deference to the injunction issued by the
44
Korean court. Even here, however, the court did not ask about the
content of South Korean trademark law; it only asked whether defer45
ence was owed to the court decision granting the actual injunction.
Having framed the issue in this way, the court resolved it by reference
to a principle that in rem cases should generally be decided by the
46
first court to exercise jurisdiction over the property in question.
And, since the original Virginia court order preceded the Korean
47
court injunction, the Virginia court found deference inappropriate.
The vision of choice of law that emerges from the decision, therefore, is founded solely on jurisdictional power and a race to the
courthouse. A state can enact legal norms with extremely broad extraterritorial reach, and courts within that state are bound to apply
those norms to a multinational dispute so long as the case was commenced there first. Needless to say, this is not a particularly thoughtful or nuanced choice-of-law regime, nor does it take into account the
possible long-term benefits that might accrue from adopting a more
restrained application of forum law or from considering the forum’s
own interest in harmonious international adjudicatory processes.
2. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona
Whereas the choice-of-law issues in GlobalSantaFe were made more
complicated by the fact that the parties were from different countries,
in Barcelona.com, all of the principal actors in the dispute were from
tem’s segmentation because other countries could establish competing systems for registries maintained outside of the United States).
44
GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 624-26 (referring to the first-in-time rule known as the Princess Lida
doctrine).
47
Id. at 625.
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48

Spain. Yet even here the Fourth Circuit, reversing a contrary ruling
49
of the district court, eschewed Spanish law and insisted on applying
50
the ACPA. Moreover, this decision was again reached without significant consideration of choice-of-law issues.
The case involved the right to the domain name barcelona.com.
In 1996, Mr. Joan Nogueras Cobo (“Nogueras”), a Spanish citizen,
registered barcelona.com with the Virginia-based domain name regis51
trar, Network Solutions. Subsequently, Nogueras formed a corpora52
tion under U.S. law, called Bcom, Inc. Despite the U.S. incorporation, however, the company had no offices, employees, or even a
53
telephone listing in the United States. Nogueras (and the Bcom
54
servers) remained in Spain.
The Barcelona City Council asserted that Nogueras had no right
to use barcelona.com under Spanish trademark law and demanded
55
that he transfer the domain name registration to the City Council.
When Nogueras refused, the City Council filed a complaint with the
56
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Several months
57
later, the WIPO panelist ruled in favor of the City Council. Instead
of transferring the domain name, however, Bcom filed suit in federal

48

Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617
(4th Cir. 2003).
49
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp.
2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002).
50
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 630. To be sure, because the claim at issue sought
only a declaratory judgment as to the plaintiff’s rights under the Lanham Act, it is possible to construe the Fourth Circuit decision as merely clarifying U.S. law without requiring that this law be the ultimate rule of decision in the case. However, nowhere
does the court state that it is rendering such a limited ruling, and instead explicitly reverses the district court’s application of Spanish law and remands so that the district
court can “grant the appropriate relief under [the Lanham Act].” Id. at 630. In addition, the appellate opinion states that the ACPA can be used specifically to reverse arbitration decisions “grounded on principles foreign or hostile to American law.” Id. at
626. Both of these statements strongly imply that the Fourth Circuit considered its application of U.S. law to be dispositive.
51
Id. at 620.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 621. Every domain name issued by Network Solutions is issued under a
contract, the terms of which include a provision requiring resolution of disputes
through the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) promulgated by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Id. The WIPO complaint was filed in
accordance with the terms of the UDRP. Id.
57
Id.
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court, again in Virginia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the regis58
tration of barcelona.com was not unlawful.
The district court, after deciding that the WIPO administrative
59
proceedings would be given “no weight,” turned to the elements of
the ACPA, first considering whether either party possessed a valid
trademark for the name “Barcelona.” Significantly, the district court
sought to answer this question by reference to both U.S. and Spanish
60
law. And, although the court concluded that neither party possessed
a U.S. trademark in the name “Barcelona,” it did find that the City
Council possessed multiple Spanish trademarks containing the term
“Barcelona,” such as “Barcelona Teatre,” “Barcelona Canal,” and
61
“Barcelona Television.” The court also noted that, under Spanish
law, if a trademark consists of two or more words, the operative issue is
which word creates the dominant impression in the mind of the con62
sumer. Here, that word is obviously “Barcelona.” Finally, the court
determined that, under Spanish law, the names of communities, municipalities, and provinces cannot be registered as trademarks without
authorization by municipal officials, and neither Nogueras nor Bcom
63
had received such authorization. Thus, the court ruled that the City
Council possessed a “legally valid Spanish trademark” for the word
64
“Barcelona.” The district court then turned to the other elements of
the ACPA, finding both likelihood of consumer confusion and the
requisite bad faith intent to profit from the domain name registra65
tion. Accordingly, the district court ruled in favor of the City Coun66
cil and refused to issue the declaratory judgment Bcom had sought.
67
The Fourth Circuit reversed. Significantly, the major issue on
which the appellate court disagreed with the trial court was the use of
Spanish law to determine whether the City Council had a valid trademark. Citing Section 1114(2)(D)(v) of the ACPA, the Fourth Circuit

58

Id.
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
60
Id. at 371-72.
61
Id. at 371-72, 372 n.3.
62
Id. at 372.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 372-73.
66
Id. at 373. The court also ruled in favor of the City Council on an ACPA counterclaim against Nogueras, finding that Nogueras had engaged in bad faith intent to
profit from the City Council’s valid trademark. Id. at 372-77.
67
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
619-20, 629 (4th Cir. 2003).
59
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emphasized that the principal issue to be decided is whether “plaintiff’s registration or use of the domain name is not unlawful under the
68
Lanham Act.” According to the appellate panel, this language makes
clear that only U.S. law may be used to determine the existence of a
69
valid trademark or its possible infringement. Having decided to apply U.S. trademark law, the court then concluded that “Barcelona” is
“a purely descriptive geographical term entitled to no trademark pro70
tection” under the ACPA. Accordingly, the court found nothing unlawful in Nogueras’ registration of barcelona.com and therefore re71
versed the district court’s ruling.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, like the court in GlobalSantaFe, applied
U.S. law to an international trademark dispute, invoking principles of
territoriality. Despite the fact that the principal actors in the dispute
were all in Spain, the appellate court opined that the ACPA, “[b]y requiring application of United States trademark law to this action
brought in a United States court by a United States corporation involving a domain name administered by a United States registrar” was
consistent with “the fundamental doctrine of territoriality upon which
72
our trademark law is presently based.”
This doctrine of territoriality likely derives from the 1883 Paris
73
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (upon which
74
the Fourth Circuit relied ). Indeed, the concern animating the Convention was that absent a doctrine of territoriality, a country could
create a “world mark” simply by granting a trademark under its local
law, thereby preventing anyone, anywhere in the world, from using
75
that name. Such an extraterritorial encroachment was unacceptable
in an era when it was presumed that trademarks could easily operate
locally because the use of a trade name in one country would have no
68

Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
Id. at 627-28.
70
Id. at 629-30.
71
Id. at 630. The Fourth Circuit also vacated the district court’s decision concerning the City Council’s counterclaim (without reaching the merits) because the appellate panel concluded that no counterclaim had actually been filed. Id.
72
Id. at 628.
73
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20 1883, art.
10bis, as last revised at Stockholm, Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
74
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628.
75
See, e.g., Tortsten Bettinger & Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark Rights in the
Global Village—International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark
Disputes on the Internet (Part Two), 31 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
285, 286 (2000) (explaining the basis of the doctrine of territoriality with regard to
trademarks).
69
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significant impact on the use of the same name by a different entity in
another country.
When considering trademarks in domain names, however, a single-minded emphasis on territoriality may itself create law with substantial extraterritorial effects. For example, by applying the ACPA in
GlobalSantaFe, the U.S. district court necessarily imposed U.S. trademark law on a South Korean domain name registrant and a South Korean domain name registrar, even though neither had any significant
contact with the United States. Likewise, in Barcelona.com, the Fourth
Circuit applied U.S. trademark law to a dispute where all the principal
actors were Spanish and where the issue concerned a domain name
associated with the name of a major city in Spain. Both of these cases
demonstrate that, by applying a rigid conception of territoriality to international trademark disputes (at least in the context of domain
names), courts run the risk of imposing U.S. law extraterritorially and
creating precisely the sort of world mark that the principle of territoriality was originally designed to avoid.
Indeed, as Graeme Dinwoodie has made clear, courts have used
the territoriality principle to avoid the need either to reconcile conflicting trademark claims or to articulate standards for determining
76
the appropriate prescriptive law to apply. Instead, courts “simply
recognize forum-determined rights and apply forum law or, alterna77
tively, dismiss the case if it does not implicate such rights or laws.”
But in an era of global commercial activity, “where consumer understanding, product markets, and producer marketing[] disdain territorialism, the value of such a rule as the lodestar for international
78
trademark law becomes questionable.” And, of course, the Internet
renders such territorialism both impractical (because of the difficulty
79
of locating a relevant transaction ) and unwise (because, as discussed
above, strict territorialism will actually result in extraterritorial encroachment on the trademark laws of other countries). In addition,
“fictionally localizing an activity that is inherently non-local . . . de-

76

See Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 31.
Id.
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal and
Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet,
reprinted in 55 BUS. LAW. 1801, 1826 (2000) (“[I]f an activity occurs in Cyberspace, it is
impossible to ascribe it to any specific physical space.”). Although somewhat exaggerated as a general matter, this statement is relatively accurate when considering the “location” of a domain name.
77
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taches the applicable law from social reality, which undermines its le80
gitimacy.”
Accordingly, we need to reconsider the traditional assumption
that trademark disputes must always be resolved by applying the law of
the forum country. Instead, cases involving international actors require courts to use choice-of-law principles in order to determine the
appropriate legal norms. Moreover, such cases may help suggest
choice-of-law frameworks that take proper account of the actual community affiliations of the parties, as well as the interests nation-states
have in being a functioning part of an interlocking international network of domestic trademark regimes.
B. Recognition of Judgments
1. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme
As with choice of law, the doctrine of recognition of judgments
encourages courts to consider the multistate nature of the legal issue
they are addressing, rather than simply assuming that the question
must be resolved through the application of forum law. While such a
doctrine is obviously a stronger command in the U.S. domestic con81
text, where the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause applies,
the principles underlying the recognition of judgments could also inform court decisions concerning international judgment recognition.
Again, as with trademark choice-of-law issues, the rise of the
Internet makes it likely that such international recognition of judgments cases will arise with greater frequency. Cyberspace creates the
possibility (and perhaps even the likelihood) that content posted online by a person in one physical location will violate the law in some
other physical location. In such circumstances, there is an inevitable
problem of extraterritoriality. Will the person who posts the content
be required to conform her activities to the norms of the most restrictive community of readers? Or, alternatively, will the community of
readers, which has adopted a norm regarding Internet content, be
subjected to the proscribed material regardless of its wishes? The answers to these questions depend both on whether the community of

80

Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 32.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
81
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readers asserts the jurisdictional authority to impose its norms on the
foreign content provider and whether the home country of the content provider chooses to recognize the norms imposed.
The celebrated case involving Yahoo!’s content in France raises
such issues. On May 22, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris issued a preliminary injunction against Yahoo.com, ordering the
site to take all possible measures to dissuade and prevent access in
France to Yahoo! auction sites that sell Nazi memorabilia or other
82
items that are sympathetic to Nazism or constitute Holocaust denial.
Undisputedly, selling such merchandise in France would violate
83
French law, and Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s French subsidiary, complied with
84
requests that access to such sites be blocked. What made this action
noteworthy was that the suit was brought not only against Yahoo.fr,
but against Yahoo.com, an American corporation, and the court
sought to enjoin access to non-French websites stored on Yahoo!’s
non-French servers.
Of course, one can easily see why the court and the complainants
in this action would have taken this additional step. Shutting down
access to web pages on Yahoo.fr does no good at all if French citizens
can, with the click of a mouse, simply go to Yahoo.com and access
those same pages. On the other hand, Yahoo! argued that the French
85
assertion of jurisdiction was impermissibly extraterritorial in scope.
According to Yahoo!, in order to comply with the injunction it would
need to remove the pages from its servers altogether (not just for the
French audience), thereby denying such material to non-French citizens, many of whom have the right to access the materials under the
82

T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgiparis20000522.htm. It is worth noting that the proper translation of the French order is a matter of some dispute. See PATRICIA L. BELLIA, PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN & DAVID
G. POST, CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 174 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the translation issue). The paraphrase I use (which
strikes me as the most accurate) derives from Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy
on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS 261, 262 (2002). An example of the type of auction
page at issue can be found at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/illustration/yahoo_auctions.
htm.
83
See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN], art. R.645-1 (prohibiting the public display of Nazi
memorabilia except for the purposes of an historical film, show, or exhibit), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleCode?commun=CPENAL&c
ode=r645-1.
84
See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (noting that Yahoo! France had posted warnings
on its site that the user could access revisionist sites through Yahoo! U.S., and that the
visiting of such sites is prohibited and punishable by French law), available at http://
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf.
85
Id.
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86

laws of their countries. Most importantly, Yahoo! argued that such
extraterritorial censoring of American web content would run afoul of
87
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, Yahoo! and
88
others contended that the French assertion of jurisdiction was an
impermissible attempt by France to impose global rules for Internet
89
expression.
Yet, as in the trademark cases, the extraterritoriality charge runs
in both directions. If France is not able to block the access of French
citizens to proscribed material, then the United States will effectively
be imposing First Amendment norms on the entire world. And
though geographical tracking software might seem to solve the problem by allowing websites to offer different content to different users,
such a solution is probably illusory because it would still require the
sites to analyze the laws of all jurisdictions to determine what material
90
to filter for which users.
In the end, rather than filter out French users, Yahoo! chose a
two-pronged strategy. First, it decided to remove the auction sites
from its servers altogether, but it claimed that such a decision was
91
“voluntary” and unrelated to the French court ruling. Second, it
filed suit in United States District Court in the Northern District of

86

Id.
Id.
88
See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Bellwether, N.Y. TIMES
ON THE W EB , Jan. 5, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/technology/
05CYBERLAW.html (quoting the warning of Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, that if “litigants and governments in other countries . . . go after American service providers . . . we could easily wind up with a lowest
common denominator standard for protected speech on the Net”).
89
As Greg Wrenn, associate general counsel for Yahoo!’s international division,
put it: “We are not going to acquiesce in the notion that foreign countries have unlimited jurisdiction to regulate the content of U.S.-based sites.” Id.
90
Indeed, one member of an expert panel appointed by the Yahoo! court to explore the feasibility of geographical filtering subsequently argued that such filtering,
though technically feasible, would impose a tremendous burden on services such as
Yahoo! because such services would be required “to maintain a huge matrix of pages
versus jurisdictions to see who can and can’t see what.” Ben Laurie, An Expert’s Apology (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://www.apache-ssl.org/apology.html.
91
See Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Enhances Commerce Sites for Higher Quality
Online Experience (Jan. 2, 2001) (announcing new product guidelines for its auction
sites that prohibit “items that are associated with groups which promote or glorify hatred and violence”), available at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release675.html. But
cf. Troy Wolverton & Jeff Pelline, Yahoo to Charge Auction Fees, Ban Hate Materials, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 2, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-4352889.html
(noting that Yahoo!’s new policy regarding hate-related materials followed action by
the French court).
87
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California, seeking a declaratory judgment that the French court’s orders were not enforceable in the United States pursuant to the First
92
Amendment.
Faced with the question of whether or not to enforce the French
court’s order, the district court started from the assumption that
United States law (and United States constitutional norms) must apply. Thus, the court framed the issue for decision solely in U.S. constitutional terms: “What is at issue here is whether it is consistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States for another nation to
regulate speech by a United States resident within the United States
on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet users in that
93
nation.”
Conceptualized in this way, the district court had little difficulty
determining that enforcement of the French court order would violate the First Amendment, concluding both that the French judgment
constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination and that it was
unconstitutionally vague. The court therefore concluded that a
United States court could not have issued such an order in the first in94
stance without violating constitutional free speech norms. But of
course, in a judgment recognition case, that is not the appropriate inquiry. Indeed, in the domestic context the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires recognition of judgments that might be illegal in the
95
state where recognition is sought. Thus, the real question is whether
this is the type of judgment that should be recognized, not whether the
court could have issued the ruling as an original matter.
To its credit, the district court did include a brief discussion of the
96
judgment recognition issue in a section titled “Comity.” And the

92

Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1186 (N.D. Ca. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
granted en banc, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
93
Id. at 1186 (emphasis omitted).
94
Id. at 1189-90.
95
See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (finding that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause “ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the
Constitution designed, demanded it”); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this Court has held that credit must be given to
the judgment of another state, although the forum would not be required to entertain
the suit on which the judgment was founded . . . .”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,
237 (1908) (holding that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and
credit in Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of
Mississippi law).
96
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93.
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court acknowledged that “United States courts generally recognize
foreign judgments and decrees unless enforcement would be prejudi97
cial or contrary to the country’s interests.” Yet, after reiterating that
the French judgment “clearly would be inconsistent with the First
98
Amendment if mandated by a court in the United States,” the district
court judge concluded that, because the foreign order would unconstitutionally chill speech occurring within U.S. borders, “the principle
of comity is outweighed by the Court’s obligation to uphold the First
99
Amendment.”
Thus, while ostensibly addressing principles of judgment recognition, the court ultimately returned to the idea that if a judgment
would be unconstitutional if issued in the United States, enforcing
that judgment also would be unconstitutional, or at least sufficiently
contrary to state interests as to overwhelm any principles of comity. By
eliding the difference between issuing a judgment and enforcing a
judgment, however, the court neglected to apply in more detail the
various principles of judgment recognition or to consider more carefully those circumstances in which U.S. interests might not truly be
100
threatened by the application of a foreign norm.
*

97

*

*

Id. at 1192.
Id.
99
Id. at 1193.
100
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, but it did so on jurisdictional
grounds, without reaching the judgment recognition issue. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
granted en banc, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). The appellate court decision did include some language suggesting skepticism about Yahoo!’s position. Indeed, the court
went so far as to observe that, because Yahoo! “obtains commercial advantage from the
fact that users located in France are able to access its website” and because Yahoo! even
displays banner advertisements in French to French users, the company is obtaining
“benefit from the fact that its content may be viewed around the world” and should
therefore not be shielded from the concomitant costs of such activities. Id. at 1126.
The court refused to reach the issue of recognition, however, deciding instead that until the French plaintiffs actually sought enforcement of the order in the United States,
they had insufficient contacts with the United States to justify jurisdiction. Id. at 1123.
Thus, though framed in the language of jurisdiction, the appellate court ruling seems
to rest primarily on the idea that Yahoo!’s request for a declaratory judgment was not
ripe for review in the absence of any indication that the French plaintiffs were actually
seeking to enforce the order. See id. (“Jurisdiction may be obtained, and the First
Amendment claim heard, once [the French parties] ask a U.S. district court to enforce
the French judgment. As of yet, the organizations have declined to do so.”). The
Ninth Circuit has agreed to rehear the case en banc, 399 F.3d 1010, but as of this writing the full court has not yet issued a ruling.
98
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It is not that the results in any of these cases are necessarily so
egregious (though I will have more to say about the outcomes later in
this Essay). What is particularly troubling, however, is the failure of
these courts even to think of the cases before them as true conflict-oflaws cases. As a result, nearly all of the conceptual and practical considerations that tend to arise in conflicts cases (as well as the voluminous scholarship on the subject) are ignored, and the truly transnational dimension of these cases is given short shrift. If nothing else,
then, we need to go back to first principles, revisit the conflicts literature, and consider whether the insights gleaned there will provide a
more nuanced vision of how best to approach these cases. The rest of
the Essay takes up this task.
II. ARTICULATING A COSMOPOLITAN VISION OF CHOICE OF LAW
Twentieth-century American choice-of-law theory has generally
been divided into three primary movements: the “vested rights” ap101
proach associated with Joseph Beale, the “governmental interests”
102
theory associated with Brainerd Currie, and the substantive law
103
method championed (in various forms) by Arthur von Mehren,
104
105
Friedrich Juenger, Luther McDougal, and others. The strengths
101

See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) (featuring
Beale as Reporter for the volume); JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934).
102
See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963).
103
See, e.g., Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 347, 371 (1974) [hereinafter von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate
Problems] (arguing that by adopting a substantive approach, “choice of law theory and
practice could . . . take a large step toward resolving the ancient conflict between the
objectives of aptness and of decisional harmony”); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren,
Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977, at 27, 43
[hereinafter von Mehren, Choice of Law] (suggesting that “functional approaches” to
choice of law issues achieve “a higher quality of . . . justice” than more traditional
choice-of-law methods).
104
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE
(1993) (calling for the adoption of a substantive approach based on qualitatively
evaluating conflicting laws to bring predictability and uniformity to conflicts thinking);
Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105,
126 (suggesting that in a mass disaster case, the court look to “the place of the tortfeasor’s conduct; . . . the place of injury; . . . [and] the home state of each party” and “select from the laws of these jurisdictions the most suitable rule of decision”); Friedrich
K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1309, 1317 (1999) (“Instead of determining whether a contract is French or New York
in nature or whether the New York rule on consideration applies, the substantive law
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and weaknesses of each of these approaches have been much rehearsed in the conflicts literature, and it is far beyond the scope of
this Essay to attempt a full description of any of these theories. Therefore, this Section simply highlights those aspects of each theory that
contribute to (or contrast with) the articulation of a cosmopolitan vision of choice of law.
A. Territorialism
Beale’s vested rights theory—which dominated U.S. conflicts
thinking in the first part of the twentieth century and was embodied
in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws—derived from a strictly terri106
torial notion of sovereign power. Accordingly, vested rights focused
only on the physical location of the essential act that, at least to Beale,
constituted the cause of action. Beale looked to the place of the
107
108
tort, or the place of contracting, or the location of the property at
109
issue.
Having “localized” the cause of action, he concluded that
only the state where the cause of action “vested” could apply its law to
110
the dispute.
These attempts to localize a cause of action were problematic
from the outset. Some of the difficulties were practical. First, Beale

approach asks whether there is an interstate or international rule on point.”); see also
Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 496 (1995) (identifying other scholars who support a substantive
law approach).
105
See, e.g., Luther L. McDougal III, “Private” International Law: Ius Gentium Versus
Choice of Law Rules or Approaches, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 536-37 (1990) (“[T]he best
way to take appropriate account of substantive policies is to do so directly through the
development and application of transnational laws.”).
106
See 1 BEALE, supra note 101, at 311-12 (Because “the power of a state is supreme
within its own territory, no other state can exercise power there,” and thus “[i]t follows
generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing, or act . . . outside the
territory of the state that passed it.”).
107
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (“The law of the place of
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.”).
108
See 2 BEALE, supra note 101, at 1091 (arguing that questions of contract validity
can generally be determined “by no other law than that which applies to the acts, that
is, by the law of the place of contracting. . . . If . . . the law of the place where the
agreement is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has
power to do so.”).
109
See 2 id. at 938 (finding that immovable property, “being unable to be taken
away from the state in which [it is located], must always in the last analysis be governed
by the laws of that state”).
110
See 1 id. at 64 (“[T]he chief task of the Conflict of Laws [is] to determine the
place where a right arose and the law that created it.”).
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was forced to create many exceptions to his general rules. Thus, although contracts were generally governed by the law of the place
where the offer was accepted, if the issue in the case concerned the
legality, validity, or scope of the performance of the contract (rather
than the fact of the contract itself), then the proper forum was the
111
place of performance, not the place of contracting. Second, it was
difficult to determine whether a particular case fell within the scope of
the general rule or the exception. For example, it is often far from
obvious whether a contract issue actually concerns formation or performance. Likewise, “[h]ow is a judge deciding a tort case to know
whether the issue is one of standard of care—governed by the law of
the place of injury—or of duty or privilege—governed by the law of
112
the place where the injurious conduct occurred?”
Third, Beale’s
system allowed judges to characterize issues as contracts or torts and
113
therefore avoid applying unpalatable laws.
But even apart from these pragmatic difficulties, there are several
other more fundamental objections to the vested rights approach, and
these objections turn out to be particularly important for generating a
cosmopolitan understanding of choice of law. First, the singleminded focus on territoriality is problematic. This is partly because
Beale had difficulty justifying why the territorial location of only one
event in a complicated set of transactions should determine the law to
be applied. For example, in the oft-discussed case of Alabama Great
114
Southern Railroad v. Carroll, an employee was injured when a train
coupling failed. The vested rights theory held that the relevant law
115
was that of the state where the injury occurred. However, given that
111

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 360 (1934) (outlining provisions in case of illegality of performance).
112
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 24 (1995).
113
For a discussion of the problems inherent in “characterization,” see, for example, ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 108 (1962) (noting that what is accomplished through characterization could be achieved more directly through other legal methods); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§
87-88 (3d ed. 1977) (calling characterization a “gimmick” and a “result-selection device”); Joseph M. Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question
in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 223-40 (1941) (discussing both primary
and secondary characterization); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or
Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743, 743-48 (1941) (providing
a useful summary of both continental and Anglo-American criticisms of characterization in the conflict of laws).
114
11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
115
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78 (1934) (explaining
that the place of wrong is where the last act occurred, and the law of that forum governs the tort).
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the negligence took place elsewhere, the choice of the place of accident seems arbitrary. Similarly, it may be difficult to determine when
and where an injury takes place (for example in a toxic tort case), and
again the state where the person happens to be when the first symp116
Yet, under Beale’s aptoms appear seems relatively unimportant.
proach such a determination is the only relevant factor in choice-of-law
analysis. Thus, even if one agreed that territorialism should be the
criterion for choice of law, it is not at all clear how best to choose the
appropriate territorial nexus, and Beale’s mechanical rules seem to
lack substance.
Moreover, the focus on territoriality by definition ignores important nonterritorial factors, such as community affiliation. For example, two parties who are domiciled in one state could avoid a local
contract rule by crossing the border, entering into the contract, and
117
returning. This is not at all hypothetical in the modern world of offshore regulatory havens, where corporations frequently attempt to
avoid various forms of governmental control by changing their territorial location. Even the United States government has, in recent years,
attempted to evade U.S. law by locating military detention facilities in
118
A purely territorial approach, therefore,
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
will have difficulty coping with a modern world where transactions
and transportation across borders are so frequent. Indeed, although
Beale treated as transcendental truth the idea that the state has complete and unchallenged authority within its own sphere and that no
119
state, therefore, may meddle in another state’s “local” affairs, we live
today in a far more fluid world of jurisdictional assertions across territorial borders and entities that cause significant impact in far-away lo120
cations. A purely territorial choice-of-law rule is unlikely to be satisfying in such a world. Accordingly, a cosmopolitan conception needs
to acknowledge that people may have multiple community affiliations
116

See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 112, at 25-26 (discussing such difficulties).
See CURRIE, supra note 102, at 87-88 (discussing this scenario).
118
See Brief for the Respondents at 14, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos.
03-334, 03-343) (arguing that because detainees “are being held by the U.S. military
outside the sovereign territory of the United States[,] . . . U.S. courts lack jurisdiction
to consider claims filed on [their] behalf”). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (concluding that no Supreme
Court precedent “categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the
United States from the ‘privilege of litigation’ in U.S. courts”).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 106-110 (outlining Beale’s territorial approach).
120
See generally Berman, supra note 9 (discussing challenges to jurisdictional rules
that are based on fixed conceptions of territorial borders).
117
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beyond simply their territorial location at a particular moment in
time, and therefore it might be appropriate for nonlocal law to apply
to their transactions, at least under some circumstances.
Second, Beale assumed that only one state’s law could ever apply
to any particular transaction, a strikingly uncosmopolitan view. To
Beale, this idea was essentially a corollary to his territorialism. If states
have complete and unfettered sovereign power within their borders
and no power beyond those borders, then as long as a cause of action
could be “located” somewhere, it necessarily followed that only one
121
state’s law could apply. Even under Beale’s scheme, however, courts
often evaded this requirement because Beale accorded to the forum
state the ability to apply its own procedural law even if the vested
122
rights approach dictated that foreign substantive norms must govern.
Thus, any judge wishing to apply local law to at least part of the dispute needed only to characterize the legal issue as “procedural.” Even
more importantly, the single-state approach rigidly rejects the reality
that, in a complex multistate transaction, the norms of multiple states
are obviously implicated. Therefore, arbitrarily choosing one to the
exclusion of the others seems inappropriate. And again, to the extent
that pure territorialism was arbitrary in the early twentieth century, it
seems even more problematic today to insist that only one state’s
norms should apply to the huge variety of multistate transactions possible in a globalized world. In order to avoid such limitations, a cosmopolitan approach can recognize the possibility that norms of multiple states might apply to different parts of the dispute or that rules
might ultimately be blended to account for the variety of normative
systems implicated in a given transaction.
A third common objection to vested rights, however, may be misplaced. Although Beale claimed to be a positivist who was merely describing how U.S. cases had generally been resolved, there can be little
doubt that his vested rights approach was based on his own legal reasoning about when state power is legitimate. As Lea Brilmayer has
pointed out, “[h]e was not merely an encyclopedist of specific doctrines and precedents but a rationalizer and a theorist of what the law

121

See BRILMAYER, supra note 112, at 28-29 (“Beale wished to assign to a single state
the right to regulate a controversy, on the theory that the rights vested in one state
only. This provided the basis for choice that was needed to make his multilateral system work.”).
122
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934) (“All matters of
procedure are governed by the law of the forum.”).
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123

ought to be.” Indeed, Beale consistently derived his principles from
his own view of the nature of law, and the cases he cited often seem
more like illustrations of his theory than data points from which his
theory was drawn. Moreover, even Beale explicitly noted that his the124
Thus,
ory could sometimes diverge from the common law reality.
the vested rights approach is not grounded in positive law, but is in125
stead an a priori methodology. Accordingly, it chooses the applicable law based on principles that are not necessarily contained in the
law of any particular state. In addition, the choice-of-law decision is
made completely independently of the substantive norms that might
apply.
This seemingly metaphysical strain to vested rights provoked vehement criticism from later scholars. But, as we will see, it may be impossible to develop any choice-of-law regime through purely positive
law because in order to apply positive law one must choose which
state’s positive law should apply, and that choice by definition cannot
126
be made pursuant to any single state’s positive law. Moreover, why is
it necessarily problematic for a choice-of-law regime to be based on
principles that operate independently from the substantive law that
will result? After all, the choice-of-law decision turns on when it is “legitimate” (whatever that word might mean) for a community to apply
its norms to a dispute. Such issues of legitimacy will necessarily revolve around community definition, affiliation, and disputes about
conflicting claims to governing authority. And none of those questions
needs to involve the content of the various legal rules at all.

123

BRILMAYER, supra note 112, at 21.
See 1 BEALE, supra note 101, at 29 (acknowledging that some of his legal principles “have not the sanction of judicial decision”).
125
See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 112, at 32 (noting that although Beale claimed
to be deriving his conflicts theory from judicial opinions and state law, “[h]is methods
belied this assertion”).
126
Larry Kramer, while deriding both Beale and Currie for separating the decision
regarding choice of law from the decision on the merits of the suit, maintains that, in
multistate cases, as in domestic cases, there is no need to make a prior “choice” of law;
rather, the relevant question is “whether some rule of positive law gives the plaintiff a
right to recover.” Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (1989). Once such a rule is identified, however, the court will
still need to decide whether the rule appropriately applies. And while Kramer sees
that process as no different from a domestic case where plaintiff and defendant are
relying on different lines of legal authority, he does acknowledge that both parochial
governmental interests and broader conflicts interests are relevant in a multistate case.
Thus, even in Kramer’s framework it still seems as if the process of identifying such
governmental or conflicts interests will require application of some a priori principles
about how best to identify those interests.
124
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Thus, a cosmopolitan approach to choice of law clearly rejects the
territorialism of vested rights as well as the idea that only one state’s
law could ever apply to any particular transaction. But cosmopolitanism borrows from vested rights a willingness to make choice of law an
a priori inquiry. The only difference is that, instead of an a priori inquiry attempting to “localize” a transaction in territorial space, cosmopolitanism would engage in an a priori debate about community
affiliation, definition, and effects in order to determine whether a
given community may appropriately (or legitimately) apply its norms
to a dispute. Further, cosmopolitanism shares with vested rights the
idea that this a priori determination is necessarily based on issues that
are conceptually distinct from the substantive norms that might be
applied.
B. Parochialism
Brainerd Currie, building on legal realism, argued that choice of
law must focus on specific policy aims, and not on the transcendent
127
In addition, Currie echoed
formal categories that Beale espoused.
positivist concerns that choice-of-law rules should not be divined from
128
“general principles” unmoored to a particular state. Rather, Currie
argued that courts should look only to the rules of actual state129
sanctioned law.
Thus, instead of starting from the idea that legal
rights could “vest” based on formal definitions even before a particular law was deemed to apply, Currie based his theory on the premise
that a court granted power by the legislature of a particular state gen130
erally applies that state’s law. Indeed, Currie argued that so long as
the forum government is deemed to have an “interest” in the dispute,
its law should always govern, regardless of the multistate character of
131
And although Currie subsequently
the events at issue in the case.
127

See CURRIE, supra note 102, at 181 (“The courts simply will not remain always
oblivious to the true operation of a system that, though speaking the language of
metaphysics, strikes down the legitimate application of the policy of a state.”).
128
See id. at 434 (criticizing the idea that choice of law is “a thing apart, a detached
science of how laws operate in space; so conceived, it is an international science, transcending local concerns for the most part”).
129
See id. at 627 (“[T]he method I advocate is the method of statutory construction, and of interpretation of common-law rules, to determine their applicability to
mixed cases.”).
130
See id. at 75 (stating his presumption in favor of forum law).
131
For example, Currie wrote that
Justice between the parties requires a decision on the merits. And where
should the New York court look for a rule of decision that will do justice be-

1846

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 1819
132

softened this position somewhat in response to critics, his governmental interest approach remains suffused with a parochial bias in favor of forum law.
Moreover, at least in the pure form in which Currie first articulated interest analysis, he made it clear that if the forum state has an
interest in applying its own law to the dispute, the existence of that interest always means that forum law will apply, even if the competing
133
Thus, the only time that forum law does
state also has an interest.
not apply, under Currie’s scheme, is when the forum state has no interest in applying its legal rules to the events at hand. Currie called
such cases “false conflicts” and therefore did not really treat them as
134
conflict-of-laws cases at all.
Of course, Currie’s approach ultimately turns on how one defines
a governmental “interest.” Currie argued that the judge must first ascertain the domestic policy that the legislature seeks to promote.
Then, the inquiry turns to whether those policies would be advanced
135
by applying the law to the particular facts under consideration.
Only then can one determine if a state has an “interest” in having its
law applied.
In practice, however, Currie defined governmental “interests”
quite narrowly. Indeed, if one parses Currie’s application of his
choice-of-law theory, it becomes clear that the sole determinant of a
governmental interest is whether application of a particular law will
help a citizen of the state under consideration actually to win the lawsuit at hand. A state is therefore deemed to have an interest only in
helping its citizens win. If, on the other hand, application of a state
law would not help the citizen of that state to win, Currie concluded
that the state has no interest, and the court is free to apply foreign
law.
tween the parties but to the body of principle and experience which has
served that purpose, as well as the ends of governmental policy, for the people
of New York in their domestic affairs?
Id. at 65.
132
See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963) (suggesting that, if a true conflict is found, a court might take a second look at the local policy it had uncovered to see if a more “restrained” view might
be possible).
133
CURRIE, supra note 102, at 184.
134
See Brainerd Currie et al., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development
in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242 (1963) (“If the court finds that one
state has an interest in the application of its policy in the circumstances of the case and
the other has none, it should apply the law of the only interested state.”).
135
CURRIE, supra note 102, at 183-84.
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One can see this narrow focus by studying Currie’s most famous
136
example, a hypothetical set of variations on the well-known case Mil137
liken v. Pratt. Milliken involved a contract between a buyer and seller
of goods, under which the buyer’s obligation had been guaranteed by
his wife. At the time, Massachusetts had a law that invalidated such
guarantees given by married women. The policy behind such a rule,
supposedly, was to protect married women from being coerced by
their husbands. But even assuming that a court has accurately identified the paternalistic Massachusetts policy, the question becomes how
to translate the existence of such a policy into the existence of an interest in a particular case involving a contracting party from a state such
138
Analyzing Currie’s various
as Maine, that does not have this rule.
permutations on the Milliken fact pattern, it is clear that, so long as the
married woman is from Massachusetts (and applying Massachusetts
law would help her to win), Currie would find a Massachusetts inter139
est.
Thus, in Currie’s view, a government’s interests for choice-of-law
purposes extend only to helping its citizens win in the short term.
Moreover, in a “true” conflict case, where the laws of each state help
its respective citizens, Currie breaks the “tie” by again choosing forum
140
law. Thus, a parochial analysis of interests joins with a parochial set
of default rules to produce a narrow focus on simply the domicile of
the parties and whether the relevant legal rules will help the domiciliary to win.
Interestingly, although Currie’s approach grew out of American
legal realism and its emphasis on policy justifications rather than for141
mal rules, his focus on the parochial interests of a state actually

136

Id. at ch. 2.
125 Mass. 374 (1878).
138
Cf. Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521, 540 (1983) (stressing the important difference between determining the
relevant domestic policy that a legislature sought to promote, and finding that the state
actually has sufficient connection to the dispute such that it has an interest in having its
law applied).
139
CURRIE, supra note 102, at ch. 2. Currie isolated four factors that might be
relevant to the choice-of-law decision: the creditor’s residence, the married woman’s
residence, the place of contracting, and the forum state. By varying these four factors,
Currie developed sixteen hypothetical permutations and provided his choice-of-law
conclusions for each. Id. at 82-83.
140
Id. at 119.
141
Currie’s critique of vested rights echoed earlier legal realist arguments. See generally David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173
(1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws,
137
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bears even more resemblance to a different school of realism: international relations realism. Although there has been little scholarly
discussion about the possible connections between these two strands
142
of “realist” thought, a consideration of international relations realism allows us to see possible limitations to Currie’s understanding of
governmental interests.
International relations realists, just like Currie, deny the existence
of a “higher” set of legal norms that might limit the ability of a nationstate to pursue its own interests. Thus, just as Currie decried the use
of a priori choice-of-law norms, the international relations realists reject the efficacy of international law norms as an independent check
on the activities of states. Indeed, international relations realists have
generally viewed such international law norms as largely irrelevant to
the power politics that are seen as the true engine of norm develop143
ment on the world stage. This approach assumes that states are motivated primarily by their parochial geopolitical interests and that international law is complied with only when it is in the interests of
powerful states to do so. These powerful states may then coerce
weaker states into accepting the regime, but in any event the particular norms of international law are largely immaterial. Even so-called
“neorealists,” who have substituted rational choice theory for a pure
focus on power, nevertheless retain the emphasis on state interests.

31 COLUM. L. REV. 368 (1931); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy
and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924). Indeed, Currie himself wrote that
Cook’s realist assault on vested rights discredited that theory “as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another.” CURRIE, supra note 102, at 6. On the other hand, at least one scholar has noted that, because
Currie did not sociologically look to past decisions of courts but instead argued against
the theoretical basis of those decisions, his “approach rested upon a conception alien
to Legal Realism.” Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1585, 1588 n.6 (1985).
142
One useful consideration of this connection may be found in BRILMAYER, supra
note 112, at 41-46.
143
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 337 (2000) (“Nations that increase protection for
their citizens’ human rights rarely do so because of the pull of international law.”); see
also Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International
Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 193-94 (1980) (arguing against
the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law,”
NAT’L INTEREST, Winter 1989-90, at 3, 5 (same). Other examples of international relations realism include EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919–1939
(Macmillan Press 1946) (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
(5th ed. 1973); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34
AM. J. INT’L L. 260 (1940).
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They view states as unitary rational actors that seek primarily to insure
144
their own preservation and dominate others. Such an emphasis acknowledges the efficacy of international law norms only to the extent
that it is in the rational self-interest of states to acknowledge such
norms. Thus, both governmental interest analysis and international
relations realism reject the idea of a transcendent set of multistate legal norms in favor of a single-minded focus on the parochial interests
of states. Moreover, both of these approaches usually define state interests narrowly to include only those that serve short-term goals.
Of course, in public international law the international relations
realist perspective has received substantial criticism from those who
see a more complicated process of norm development in the global
arena. For example, some have focused on the idea of “transnational
legal process,” which provides a framework for understanding how
145
countries may internalize international or transnational norms.
146
Others have pointed to transnational governmental
and non147
governmental networks that create multistate regulatory policies.
Promising new research has used institutional sociology to try to understand, in a more nuanced way, how nation-state bureaucracies are
affected by the very fact that they are embedded in an international
148
system. And, in general, a burgeoning field of scholarship is transforming international law’s traditional focus on nation-states into a
149
This scholarship
broader understanding of law and globalization.

144

See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 118 (1979)
(viewing states as “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and,
at a maximum, drive for universal domination”).
145
For discussion of the transnational legal process framework, see Harold
Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)).
146
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (constructing a
model for understanding governmental networks).
147
See, e.g., Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human
Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335, 134151, 1365-87 (1999) (discussing the increasing importance of transnational civil societies, and the corresponding effect on international human rights law).
148
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003).
149
For an overview of this scholarship, see Paul Schiff Berman, From International
Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); see also THE
GLOBALIZATION OF JUSTICE (Paul Schiff Berman ed., forthcoming 2005) (collecting
essays).
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recognizes that the interests of nation-states are affected by many actors in the world system, that rhetorical statements of international legal norms, even without formal enforcement power, have important
impact on popular legal consciousness, and that states exercise soft
power in part by demonstrating compliance with international
150
norms.
Many of these same critiques apply to Currie’s idea of governmental interests as well. First, even if one is concerned only with purely
power-driven state interest, one might easily imagine a state to have
interests beyond simply allowing its citizen to win a particular case.
Indeed, from a long-term geopolitical perspective, whether or not an
individual citizen wins a lawsuit is actually of very little interest to a
state. Instead, states may have an interest in being seen to comply
with an agreed-upon international order. States benefit from a shared
world system, with its interlocking set of reciprocal benefits and burdens. If a state is too parochial in pursuit of its short-term interests, it
may damage its longer-term goals by creating a lack of trust in other
151
states.
As economists have long recognized, repeat players tend to
152
Accordbenefit from cooperative rather than parochial behavior.
150

THE GLOBALIZATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 149; Berman, supra note 149.
As Larry Kramer has pointed out, even if we assume that states are interested
only in advancing the domestic policies underlying their particular laws, “[e]nforcing
foreign law in some cases only may do this better than always enforcing forum law because it invites reciprocal action that advances forum policies in cases brought elsewhere.” Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1016 (1991).
Kramer argues that “[i]f every state adopts the ‘law of the forum’ solution and enforces
its law in true conflict cases, each state’s policies will be advanced only in true conflicts
litigated in that state’s courts. But there is no guarantee that this will include even half
the cases.” Id. Likewise, Laurence Helfer and Graeme Dinwoodie observe that,
though a country might pursue its objectives simply by mandating application of its law
to all disputes, “a political unit might more rationally conclude that the best route to
making its own internal policy values effective in the greatest possible number of
multistate situations is to take into account more than proceedings before its own tribunals.” Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems:
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
141, 261 (2001). Accordingly, they observe, like Kramer, that
the courts of State A may apply, or at least consider, the internal policies of
State B in the hope (and expectation) that the courts of State B will consider
the internal policy values of State A in cases where State A would have a strong
interest in seeing its internal values applied.
Id.
152
See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 19-20 (1984)
(describing “tit for tat” strategy as an example of repeat play that can produce cooperation even among self-interested individuals); see also David M. Kreps et al., Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982)
(discussing the effect of repeat play on prisoner’s dilemma games).
151
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ingly, a state that refuses to defer to foreign norms will likely find that
its norms receive less deference from others in the future. Currie,
therefore, ignores the possibility that states might benefit from establishing a system of multilateral choice-of-law rules that each state
would obey rather than asking whether a state has a short-term inter153
est in each particular case.
Second, international law norms that limit unfettered nation-state
sovereignty do not necessarily lose their normative power just because
they are not themselves issued by entities that wield coercive power.
Indeed, while Currie rejected Beale’s vested rights approach in part
because it derived its authority from legal principles unmoored to a
particular state’s law, many such unmoored legal principles end up
having real effect in the world. Thus, Currie assumes that only state
interests are relevant and further assumes that those interests are unaffected by the very fact that the state is part of an international system. But neither assumption is necessarily true. We could adopt a
choice-of-law rule that takes the perspective not of an individual state
but of the entire global legal system, and then try to resolve the
choice-of-law question. Moreover, even from the perspective of an individual state, the very fact that it is part of an international system
and subject to diplomatic and other pressures means that courts cannot effectively further state interests by parochially making sure that
the law applied to any given multistate case will always benefit its own
citizens.
Third, Currie cannot, in any event, avoid the problem of creating
a priori choice-of-law norms unmoored to a state legal regime. This is
because his governmental interest analysis necessarily looks to the
domicile of the parties to determine whether a state has an interest in
the dispute. But, we might ask, why is the domicile of the parties the
most important connecting factor? Why not territory (as in vested
rights) or some other potentially relevant rubric? The answer requires
Currie to rely on some sort of normative judgment that precedes the
choice-of-law decision itself. Thus, Currie’s framework is as much an a

153

Indeed, Currie’s understanding of a governmental interest suffers from flaws
that behavioral economists have identified in many forms of “intertemporal decision
making.” The idea is that decision makers systematically mispredict their own future
preferences because they fail to appreciate the ways in which their long-term preferences may differ from their current ones. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see
Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J.
ECON. LIT. 351, 367-68 (2002).
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priori philosophical position as Beale’s is, and cannot claim authority
154
on the basis of being more connected to positive law.
Finally, Currie’s conception of a governmental interest tends to
presuppose that the interest itself is a legitimate one for the government to pursue. For example, imagine that a given state took the position that its environmental protection statutes should apply to all
citizens of the world because all citizens have a stake in a sustainable
planet. Currie’s interest analysis, by its terms, would need to give effect to this stated governmental interest. Yet in a case brought in that
state involving two parties, neither of whom is a citizen of the state,
one suspects that Currie would not insist on the application of forum
law. Thus, whatever else one can say about governmental interest
analysis, its scope seems to be derived from more general principles of
legitimacy; it is not derived from legislative policy alone.
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, governmental interest
analysis at least frees us from the rigid territorialism of vested rights
and allows us to consider what the interests of states might be in a
globalized multilateral system. We can therefore accept that a focus
on interests is appropriate, without also accepting Currie’s peculiarly
narrow and parochial conception of such interests. Instead, a cosmopolitan vision can consider a broader set of governmental interests in
being part of an interlocking world system of transnational regulation
and multiple community affiliation.
C. Substantivism
Over the past few decades, several conflicts scholars have articulated (without fully developing) a distinct choice-of-law methodology
that emphasizes the ability of judges to create special substantive rules
in multistate cases. In 1974, Arthur von Mehren noted “the advantages, in certain multistate or multiple contact situations, of applying
special rules that are not necessarily chosen from among provisions in
the domestic law of any of the jurisdictions viewed as legitimately con155
Such special
cerned with the resolution of the issues presented.”
154

See Kramer, supra note 126, at 1308 (“Currie . . . made the same conceptual
mistake he correctly accused traditional choice of law scholars of making: he treated
‘choosing’ the applicable law as a threshold inquiry distinct from ‘applying’ the chosen
law.”).
155
von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems, supra note 103, at
348; see also von Mehren, Choice of Law, supra note 103, at 27, 38-40 (suggesting circumstances in which conflict of laws might best be resolved by a compromise among the
values of the states involved).
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multijurisdictional rules, von Mehren suggested, would involve some
156
sort of compromise among the values of the various states involved.
157
158
Subsequently, Friedrich Juenger and Luther McDougal have also
argued for the development and application of transnational laws
fashioned by judges in multistate cases. And both have noted that this
sort of substantive transnational law has historical antecedents dating
159
back to the Roman Empire.
Yet, although the substantive law
method helps avoid binary either/or choice-of-law questions, the rise
of nation-states—and the accompanying positivist idea that law must
be clearly identified with a sovereign entity—pushed substantive approaches to the background.
Most recently, Graeme Dinwoodie has argued for a substantive law
160
approach to international copyright disputes. Dinwoodie notes that
courts in ordinary domestic disputes often must generate common law
161
rules or glosses on legislative enactments. Indeed, any time a court
adjudicates a dispute that does not involve a single governing rule the
162
For example, a court
judge must select among possible models.
asked for the first time to consider the validity of a contract formed via
telephone might look for guidance both to prior rules concerning
face-to-face negotiations and to prior rules concerning negotiations by
163
mail. As Dinwoodie points out, a court may consider both rules, but
is not required to choose either; instead the court is likely to blend
164
Likewise, Dinwoodie argues, a
principles from each set of rules.
court in a multistate dispute should not consider itself bound to
choose one state’s law over the other in toto; it should instead be free
to craft a hybrid rule that reflects the interests of the multiple states
165
and parties involved.

156

See von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems, supra note 103, at
359 (discussing states’ willingness to deal in foreign courts).
157
For a sample of Juenger’s work, see sources cited supra note 104.
158
See, e.g., McDougal, supra note 105.
159
See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 104, at 8-10 (discussing the development of the ius
gentium by the praetor peregrinus, starting around 242 B.C., to deal with cases involving
non-Romans).
160
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 542-80 (2000).
161
See id. at 548 (“Courts . . . often . . . generate rules, rather than merely apply
them . . . .”).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
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Such substantive lawmaking is particularly important in the international context. First, as Dinwoodie points out, “statutory rules enacted by a national legislature are rarely enacted with an eye to inter166
national disputes or conduct.”
And even when legislators actually
consider activities abroad, they do so to pursue domestic policy priori167
Second,
ties, with little consideration for multistate implications.
Dinwoodie argues that “a method that draws its applicable rule in international cases from an amalgam of national and international
norms reflects the complex and interwoven forces that govern citi168
zens’ conduct in a global society.” Thus, a choice-of-law regime that
forces binary choices requires citizens to be judged according to a single state norm in a world where those citizens affiliate with multiple
states. Indeed, the mere fact that a dispute is multinational necessarily means that it implicates interests that are different from a purely
domestic dispute. Accordingly, the substantive law method asks
judges to consider these added factors and craft rules based on a variety of national and international legal norms.
The substantive method has much to recommend it. More than
the other two approaches, it takes seriously the multistate nature of
the dispute and seeks to find a way to reconcile the multiple communities potentially implicated. And, though it asks judges to engage in
creative common law interpretation, which could result in a degree of
unpredictability, such difficulties are likely to subside over time, as
judges develop a series of international law norms that become relatively settled. Moreover, this method of creating international norms
is likely to happen more rapidly than, for example, through the international treaty process. Thus, the substantive law method may allow
legal rules to evolve more rapidly in the face of technological innova169
tion.
Nevertheless, I see at least two problems with the substantive approach. First, a method that asks judges to craft international or hybrid law unmoored to the positive law of their own states is likely to
run into significant objections from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. Of course, it is true that any proposal that judges candidly
engage in lawmaking is likely to raise a similar objection. But in this
166

Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
168
Id. at 550.
169
See id. at 569 (“Using the substantive choice of law method as part of international lawmaking can supply the dynamism appropriately missing from classical public
international lawmaking.”).
167
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context the critique is perhaps more trenchant because the substantive law method explicitly asks judges to look to legal sources external
to the very sources of the courts’ own authority and legitimacy. In this
sense, those seeking to develop hybrid domestic/international norms
might be better off arguing for an expansion of the idea of governmental interests. At least then the hybrid norms would be nominally
grounded in the long-term interests of the state in which the court
sits. Indeed, Dinwoodie himself acknowledges that governmental interest analysis, if expanded, could in fact be used to justify an approach like his substantive law method: “[I]f a legislature were consciously to address the policies by which it would seek to regulate
international disputes before its courts, it might articulate a different
policy that took into account the competing interests of other states as
170
well as its own interest.” Thus, expanding the idea of a governmental interest may raise fewer legitimacy concerns than the substantive
law method, yet reach the same results.
Second, the substantive method, true to its name, focuses on the
substance of the law to be applied rather than any external criteria
that might be relevant to choosing the appropriate norms. Accordingly, although both vested rights and governmental interest analysis
choose the applicable law based on a priori considerations—the “location” of the cause of action or the domicile of the parties—the substantive method emphasizes the need to choose governing norms
rather a governing jurisdiction. But while proponents of the substan171
tive law method tout this feature as an advantage, something is lost
by not conducting a separate inquiry concerning prescriptive jurisdiction. After all, it seems reasonable to expect that the extent of the
parties’ relationships to the various states whose law might apply
should have some independent bearing on the choice-of-law inquiry.
Moreover, such an inquiry need not be either the formalist exercise
envisioned by Beale or the parochial one advocated by Currie.
Rather, choice of law could become the locus for debates about the
varieties of community definition and affiliation present in the case
and the degree to which issues of physical geographical location
should remain salient as a guide to choice of law. If courts focus too
much on the substance of the possible governing norms without conducting a separate choice-of-law inquiry, this important discussion
could be elided or de-emphasized.
170

Id. at 549.
See, e.g., id. at 547-48 (discussing the advantages of choosing rules or solutions
rather than jurisdictions).
171
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To be fair, Dinwoodie himself seeks to avoid this problem. Indeed, in resolving a hypothetical transnational copyright dispute using
the substantive law method, he asks courts to consider “all relevant in172
terests—national, international, and postnational,” an inquiry that
presumably could include a discussion of community affiliation.
Moreover, he masterfully dissects the various governmental interests,
the trends in the law that courts might consider, and the hybrid solu173
But even this admirable treatment of
tions that could be devised.
transnational choice of law still suffers from the substantive law
method’s insistence on combining the substantive analysis with the
choice-of-law inquiry. Because of Dinwoodie’s substantive focus, his
discussion is almost completely confined to the various legal rules that
might apply, their strengths and weaknesses, and the interests of the
states involved. He does not, however, explicitly discuss the parties,
nor does he engage in a discussion about the extent of the parties’ affiliation with various normative communities or consider whether it is
appropriate to see those parties as more connected to one of those
communities in particular. Thus, while Dinwoodie’s substantivism
usefully employs a cosmopolitan framework when analyzing the norms
in play, the substantive method tends (even in his version) to focus
too little on the various possible definitions of community that might
be available and the particular affiliations of the parties themselves.
Thus, although the substantive method appropriately asks judges
to consider the distinctively international aspects of a dispute and to
fashion creative hybrid solutions to multistate problems, it does so in a
way that raises questions of democratic legitimacy and short-circuits
important discussion about the appropriate scope of prescriptive jurisdiction. To avoid such problems, a cosmopolitan approach is
grounded in an expanded conception of governmental interests and
allows debate about the scope of a community’s legal norms before addressing the norms themselves. Only through such debate can there
be common law development of principles concerning the appropriate understanding of a legal community in a world of increasingly
overlapping norm-generating groups.
D. Cosmopolitanism
Choice-of-law debates involve more than simply questions about
which governing norms will be applied to a dispute. In addition, such
172
173

Id. at 561.
See id. at 561-69.
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debates address core issues of community definition and affiliation,
particularly in a world where the significance of territorial location
may be less salient than it once was. The advantage of cosmopolitanism as a choice-of-law framework is precisely the fact that cosmopolitanism seeks to understand these issues of multiple community affiliation. Indeed, cosmopolitanism starts from the premise that
community affiliations are always plural and can be detached from
174
mere spatial location. Thus, cosmopolitans recognize that “[w]e are
connected to all sorts of places, causally if not always consciously, including many that we have never traveled to, that we have perhaps
only seen on television—including the place where the television itself
175
was manufactured.”
Cosmopolitanism can be traced at least as far back as the Stoics,
who argued that each of us dwells in two communities: “the local
community of our birth, and the community of human argument and
aspiration that ‘is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our na176
tion by the sun.’”
Recognizing the dangers of factionalism that
come from allegiance to the political life of a group, the Stoics contended that only by placing primary allegiance in the world community can mutual problems be addressed.
Martha Nussbaum has recently elaborated on the Stoic ideal in an
essay touting the cosmopolitan perspective. According to Nussbaum,
cosmopolitanism does not require one to give up local identifications,
177
which, she acknowledges, “can be a source of great richness in life.”
Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we think of ourselves as
surrounded by a series of concentric circles:
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family,
then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local
groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can easily
174

For a sampling of the scholarship in this area, see generally JESSICA BERMAN,
MODERNIST FICTION, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY 1-27
(2001); COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION (Pheng Cheah
& Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) [hereinafter COSMOPOLITICS]; GLOBALIZATION (Arjun
Appadurai ed., 2001); ULF HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: CULTURE,
PEOPLE, PLACES (1996); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM WITH RESPONDENTS, FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996); BRUCE
ROBBINS, FEELING GLOBAL: INTERNATIONALISM IN DISTRESS (1999).
175
Bruce Robbins, Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in
COSMOPOLITICS, supra note 174, at 1, 3.
176
Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in NUSSBAUM WITH
RESPONDENTS, supra note 174, at 2, 7 (quoting the Roman playwright Seneca).
177
Id. at 9.
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add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest
178
one, humanity as a whole.

Moreover, we need not relinquish special affiliations and identifications with the various groups. Indeed, “[w]e need not think of them
as superficial, and we may think of our identity as constituted partly by
179
them.”
But, Nussbaum argues, “we should also work to make all
human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base
our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give
180
the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.”
181
In this vision, people could be “cosmopolitan patriots,” accepting their responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their
home community, while at the same time recognizing that such cultural practices are always shifting as people move from place to place.
“The result would be a world in which each local form of human life
was the result of long-term and persistent processes of cultural hybridization—a world, in that respect, much like the world we live in
182
now.”
Iris Young has used the ideal of the “unoppressive city” as a model
183
for a similarly multifaceted understanding of community.
She argues that “community” is always a politically problematic term because
“those motivated by it will tend to suppress differences among themselves or implicitly to exclude from their political groups persons with
184
whom they do not identify.” Thus “[t]he desire for community relies on the same desire for social wholeness and identification that
underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism on the one hand and political
185
Instead, Young envisions ideal city life
sectarianism on the other.”
186
as the “‘being-together’ of strangers.”
These strangers may remain
178

Id.
Id.
180
Id.
181
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS, supra note
174, at 91.
182
Id. at 92.
183
See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 317 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Our political
ideal is the unoppressive city.”); see also Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1996) (invoking Young’s ideal city to reclaim the idea of community as “the being together of strangers,” rather than limiting community to “feelings of identity or unity”).
184
Young, supra note 183, at 300.
185
Id. at 302.
186
Id. at 318.
179
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strangers and continue to “experience each other as other.”
Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall group identification and
188
They beloyalty. Yet, they are open to “unassimilated otherness.”
long to various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with other groups. But they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those others. Such interactions instantiate an
189
alternative kind of community, one that is never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that nevertheless prevents different groups
190
from ever being completely outside one another. In a city’s public
spaces, Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal: “The city consists
in a great diversity of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities and functions, whose lives and
191
movements mingle and overlap in public spaces.”
In this vision,
there can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations without
exclusion.
Although Young does not refer to her vision as cosmopolitan, it
fits comfortably within the understanding of community affiliation I
sketch here. Cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international citizenship in the sense of international harmonization and
standardization, but instead is a recognition of multiple refracted differences where (as in Young’s ideal city) people acknowledge links
with the “other” without demanding assimilation or ostracism. Cos192
mopolitanism seeks “flexible citizenship,” in which people are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and
allegiances. These allegiances could also include nonterritorial communities, such as those found in Internet chat rooms. The cosmopoli187

Id.
Id. at 319.
189
Young resists using the word “community” because of the “urge to unity” the
term conveys, but acknowledges that “[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation
whether one chooses to call” her vision “community.” Id. at 320; see also Frug, supra
note 183, at 1049 (“Unlike Young, I do not cede the term community to those who
evoke the romance of togetherness.”).
190
See Young, supra note 183, at 319 (positing that a group of strangers living side
by side “instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an understanding of
groups and cultures that are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions
that do not issue in community, yet which prevent them from being outside of one another”).
191
Id.
192
See AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP :
T HE CULTURAL LOGICS OF
TRANSNATIONALITY 6 (1999) (describing how “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” foster a form of transnationality she
calls “flexible citizenship”).
188
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tan worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of
personal identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping
communities. “[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing
cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment,
193
or attachment at a distance.”
A cosmopolitan conception of choice of law might at first seem an
oxymoron because cosmopolitanism is often equated with univer194
salism. And of course, if we constructed one universal “world community” with one set of governing rules, there would never need to be
a “choice of law” in the sense that conflict-of-laws scholars use the
term. Yet, the cosmopolitan worldview I am describing, while eschewing a strict reliance on territorial location and geographical borders,
also rejects the goal of universalism. Although the vision of one world
community is attractive in its idealism, it strikes me as misguided for
several reasons. First, it tends to require that we see ourselves primarily
as citizens of the world and therefore tends to dissolve the multirootedness of community affiliation into one global community. Second,
it fails to capture the extreme emotional ties people still feel to dis195
Thus, universalism may
tinct transnational or local communities.
ignore the very attachments people hold most deeply. Third, as Anupam Chander has pointed out, the aspiration that we become solely
citizens of the world is at least partly based on an internationalization
196
of John Rawls’s theory of justice and is therefore subject to the same
criticism Rawls has long faced: that his theory assumes a self detached
197
from the social and cultural context that makes such a self possible.
193

Robbins, supra note 175, at 3.
See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 879
(2004) (“Rather than aspiring to universal cosmopolitanism, statelessness may well foster
reversion to a selfish individualism” (emphasis added)); see also Bruce Ackerman,
Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 534 (1994) (“If I were a European right now, I
hope I would have the guts to stand up for rootless cosmopolitanism: forget this nationalistic claptrap, and let us build a world worthy of free and equal human beings.”);
Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, (2001) (“The cosmopolitan
model . . . dissolves the multirootedness of diasporas into a global identity.”).
195
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community
in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 374 (1996) (“The powerful pull of loyalty
exerted by the imagined nation demonstrates that, even in the age of science, a loyalty
system based on romantic myths of shared history and kinship has a capacity to endure . . . .”).
196
See Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, 41 NOMOS 12,
36 (1999) (noting that a number of philosophers take a global version of Rawls’s theory of justice as their starting point).
197
See Chander, supra note 194, at 1047 (criticizing cosmopolitanism because it
embraces an “image of the self that removes the aspects that make the self special”).
194
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Fourth, an ongoing system of universal governing norms poses such a
strong challenge to our current notions of nation-state sovereignty
that, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely to be adopted widely in
the foreseeable future. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, in order
to create a set of universal legal norms that overrides local variation,
one needs to presuppose a world citizenry devoid of both particularist
ties and normative discussion about the relative importance of such
ties. Thus, universalism can cut off debate about the nature of overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism or parochialism
does.
A cosmopolitan conception of choice of law, in contrast, makes no
attempt to deny the multirootedness of individuals within a variety of
communities, both territorial and nonterritorial. Indeed, the basic
tenet of cosmopolitanism, as I define it, is the acknowledgment of
multiple communities, rather than the erasure of all communities except the most encompassing. Thus, although a cosmopolitan conception of choice of law often seeks to acknowledge and accommodate
transnational and international norms, it does not require a univer198
salist belief in a single world community.
A choice-of-law regime built on cosmopolitan principles, therefore, asks courts to consider the variety of normative communities
with possible ties to a particular dispute. In doing so judges must see
themselves as part of an interlocking network of domestic, transnational, and international norms. Recognizing the “complex and in199
terwoven forces that govern citizens’ conduct in a global society,”
courts can develop a jurisprudence that reflects this cosmopolitan reality.

Chander ascribes this position to cosmopolitanism. While I agree with his critique, I
believe he is actually targeting what I call “universalism.” As this Section makes clear, I
view cosmopolitanism as the recognition of multiple attachments, not the desire for a
single world citizenry.
198
As Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out:
[O]ne can strive for greater uniformity on certain matters without wholly undermining the local values that conflictual methodology sustains. Comparative knowledge and comparative method will contribute to a better understanding of when, and how, each of these sometimes competing values should
be given greater weight. The project of comparativists therefore is not to reveal universal truths, nor merely destructively to declare that the individuality
of perspective renders the discipline an irrelevance and common values a
fraud.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 452 (2001).
199
Dinwoodie, supra note 160, at 550.
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Such a jurisprudence looks to a variety of possible legal sources.
First, courts can consider the multiple domestic norms of nation-states
affected by the dispute. In considering which national norms to give
greatest salience, courts must consider the community affiliations of
the parties and the effect of various rules on the polities of the affected states. Moreover, whereas most traditional choice-of-law regimes require a choice of one national norm, a cosmopolitan approach permits judges to develop a hybrid rule that may not
correspond to any particular national regime. Second, international
treaties, agreements, or other statements of evolving international or
transnational norms may provide relevant guidance. Third, courts
should consider community affiliations that are not associated with
nation-states, such as industry standards, norms of behavior promulgated by non-governmental organizations, community custom, and
rules associated with particular activities, such as Internet usage.
Fourth, courts should take into account traditional conflicts principles. For example, a useful choice-of-law framework should not develop rules that encourage a regulatory “race to the bottom” by making it easy to evade legal regimes.
At first glance, this approach might seem similar to the one taken
by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which permits courts to
200
consult a “grab bag” of factors to reach a choice-of-law decision, in201
Including “the needs of the interstate and international system.”
deed, the Second Restatement’s emphasis on finding the place with the
202
“most significant relationship” to the dispute, does at least turn the
focus from pure territorial contacts to relationships. It is unclear,
however, whether such “relationships” include affiliations that are neither citizenship-based nor territory-based. In contrast, cosmopolitanism would acknowledge such additional affiliations. The Second Restatement also maintains a series of Beale-like presumptions about the
203
proper choice-of-law default rules for specific types of cases. These
presumptions tend to be based on territoriality and may actually
trump the more general (and more cosmopolitan) guidance about
204
the needs of the interstate and international system. Thus, though

200

BRILMAYER, supra note 112, at 74.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
202
See, e.g., id. § 145(1).
203
Compare, e.g., id. § 145 (listing general principles for tort cases), with id. § 188
(contract cases), and id. § 193 (insurance cases).
204
See, e.g., Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369,
1372-73 (Colo. 1979) (ruling that, because the presumptions in section 196 had not
201
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one could perhaps interpret the Second Restatement in a cosmopolitan
way, the emphasis of the Restatement is distinctly different.
A cosmopolitan approach does, however, share some basic tenets
with the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Section 403 of the
Restatement sets forth a series of principles intended to combat judicial
(or legislative) parochialism. These principles include many of the
factors a cosmopolitan approach privileges. For example, section
403(2)(b) asks judges to consider “the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and
205
the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated.”
Likewise, section 403(2)(f) cites “the extent to which the regulation is
206
consistent with the traditions of the international system.”
These,
and the other nonexclusive “reasonableness” factors of section 403
would certainly be among the criteria for making a choice-of-law decision using a cosmopolitan framework. Thus, to some extent the cosmopolitan vision I sketch here draws upon the Third Restatement, and
judges employing the Third Restatement approach could comfortably fit
the cosmopolitan principles I describe into their customary analyses.
Indeed, cosmopolitanism could even be seen to provide an additional
justification for the Restatement’s emphasis on “connections” between
the regulating state and the relevant actor.
On the other hand, a cosmopolitan conception asks judges explicitly to focus on community affiliation, which may prompt a different
sort of inquiry from the Restatement’s more generalized call to reasonableness. Indeed, among the benefits of a cosmopolitan framework is
that it makes conflict of laws the site for ongoing legal discussions
about the changing nature of community, personal identification, and
social conceptions of space, distance, and borders. Such discussions
may be less likely if judges are purporting to apply simply a multifactor reasonableness standard. Thus, even if many cases would ultimately be decided the same way under either a cosmopolitan test or
one derived from the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations, the inquiry
may be (though of course need not be) significantly different.
Perhaps most importantly, because a focus on community affiliation may lead us to consider nonstate communities, a cosmopolitan
framework is far more likely to allow a pluralist consideration of how
norms generated outside of formal governmental channels may bind
been rebutted, the general principles in section 6 would not be considered).
205
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2)(b) (1987).
206
Id. at § 403(2)(f).
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sub-, supra-, and transnational communities. Thus, cosmopolitanism
may open conceptual space for what Andreas Fischer-Lescano and
Gunther Teubner have called “an inter-systemic conflicts law, derived
not from collisions between the distinct nations of private interna207
tional law, but from collisions between distinct global social sectors.”
Articulating such a pluralist vision of conflict of laws is beyond the
scope of this Essay, but at the very least cosmopolitanism allows us to
begin thinking along these lines. In contrast, the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations, though it takes a significant step forward by asking
judges to consider norms of antiparochialism when making choice-oflaw decisions, may ultimately be too state-centered to provide the
theoretical underpinnings for conflict of laws in an era of diffused
208
sovereignty.
As mentioned previously, a cosmopolitan approach to choice of
law borrows elements not only from the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations, but from each of the three major choice-of-law methods al209
ready discussed. While eschewing both Beale’s rigid formalism and
his reification of territorial location as the basis for choice-of-law decisions, cosmopolitanism does recognize the importance of thinking
about choice of law separately from the substantive norm to be applied. Thus, courts employing a cosmopolitan approach should discuss the possibly relevant community affiliations and consider their
relative importance before turning to an application of substantive
law. In this way, choice of law becomes the terrain for debate about
the proper scope of community dominion in an era when territorial
borders no longer adequately delimit community boundaries.
Likewise, while rejecting Currie’s parochial application of governmental interest analysis, a cosmopolitan approach is firmly grounded
in an expanded notion of governmental interests. Indeed, as courts
consider multiple community affiliations and develop hybrid rules for
resolving multistate disputes, they do so not because they are ignoring
the policy choices of their home state, but because they are effectuating
their state’s broader interest in taking part in a global community.
207

Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner (Michelle Everson trans.), Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 999, 1000 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208
Cf. Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information
Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 85-104 (2004) (articulating a theory of state sovereignty that he calls “thin statism”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 184-86 (arguing that “[t]he state is not disappearing,
it is disaggregating”).
209
See supra Part II.
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Thus, a cosmopolitan approach is ultimately moored to an expanded
conception of how governments must operate in an interconnected
world.
Finally, because it is based on this broader conception of governmental interests, a cosmopolitan approach avoids some of the concerns about democratic legitimacy raised by the substantive law
method. Moreover, by treating choice of law as an a priori discussion
of community definition and affiliation, cosmopolitanism rejects the
undue emphasis on substantive rules that is the hallmark of the substantive law method. Yet cosmopolitanism, like the substantive law
method, asks courts resolving multistate disputes to see themselves as
international and transnational actors who are engaging in an international dialogue about legal norms. Accordingly, they must consider
how best to construct a world system of law (and not just pursue parochial interests), and they may develop hybrid norms for resolving
multistate disputes.
A cosmopolitan approach to international adjudication, therefore,
allows courts to engage in a dialogue with each other concerning the
appropriate definition of community affiliation and the appropriate
scope of prescriptive jurisdiction. In addition, the approach asks
courts to develop international norms, thereby harnessing the generative potential of international litigation. Treaties and other formal instruments of international lawmaking are cumbersome and slow to adjust to changing technologies or social conditions; international
common law adjudication is far more dynamic. As a result, international private law litigation can serve public values by creating a forum
for debates both about community affiliation and new common law
210
international norms.
211
Of course, such dynamism also raises important concerns.
For
example, one might fear that common law norm development will
diminish the predictability of legal rules. Indeed, many actors would
certainly sacrifice some dynamism in exchange for the ability to predict judicial outcomes more effectively. This concern may, however,
be overstated for several reasons. First, as with all common law rules,
the amount of uncertainty diminishes over time as areas of doctrine
become more settled. Likewise, as courts develop norms for determining that certain activities establish community ties sufficient to jus210

See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 15, at 444-48 (describing the importance of judgemade common law procedural doctrines in international and transnational litigation).
211
The substantive law method also implicates these same concerns, and my discussion here largely tracks a similar discussion in Dinwoodie, supra note 160, at 571-75.
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tify the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, the uncertainty will diminish. Second, current choice-of-law analysis is already quite unpredict212
Third, concerns about certainty in the
able and often arbitrary.
commercial context are undermined by the fact that international
commercial arbitration, which has few if any fixed substantive principles, has nevertheless been an extraordinarily popular means of resolving disputes. Finally, we must remember that it is not unprecedented for courts to introduce some uncertainty during the transition
from one choice-of-law regime to another. For example, in the classic
213
conflicts case of Neumeier v. Kuehner, the New York State Court of
Appeals explicitly acknowledged that its rejection of a vested rights
approach several years earlier had created uncertainty:
When . . . we rejected the mechanical place of injury rule in personal
injury cases because it failed to take account of underlying policy considerations, we were willing to sacrifice the certainty provided by the old
rule for the more just, fair and practical result that may best be achieved
by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which has the
greatest concern with, or interest in, the specific issue raised in the litigation. In consequence of the change effected—and this was to be anticipated—our decisions . . . have, it must be acknowledged, lacked consis214
tency.

Nevertheless, the court went out of its way to embrace the ad hoc,
case-by-case approach it had used to construct the new choice-of-law
215
regime. Significantly, the court emphasized that such common law
development helps to uncover over time the appropriate values and
policies to be weighed by courts, leading eventually to the formulation
of new “rules of general applicability, promising a fair level of predict216
ability.” The ultimate outcome, according to the court, is worth the
short-term cost.
Another concern, discussed previously, is that a court taking a
cosmopolitan approach is behaving illegitimately because it is not ap-

212

Cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2448, 2449 (1999) (“Choice of law is a mess. That much has become a truism.”). For example, strict territorialism may encourage forum-shopping, with its concomitant lack of certainty.
213
286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
214
Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
215
See id. (noting that the prior cases “enable us to formulate a set of basic principles that may be profitably utilized, for they have helped us uncover the underlying
values and policies which are operative in this area of the law”).
216
Id. (citing Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 403 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., concurring)).
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217

plying forum law.
It must be remembered, however, that vested
rights also often required courts to apply other states’ laws; only the
parochial understanding of governmental interests insists that forum
law trump. Moreover, with an expanded understanding of governmental interests, there is no reason to fear that a court applying a
cosmopolitan vision is necessarily unmoored from the long-term interest of the government to which the court owes its legal authority.
Finally, it is important to remember that this cosmopolitan lawmaking
is being engaged in not by unelected international regulators or bureaucrats but by national judges. Such judges come to the bench
through domestic political or bureaucratic processes, and they are national citizens presumably influenced by national politics. Accordingly, “[t]he national courts that develop international norms are
connected to a national legislative or political unit that can revisit ap218
By definition, then, even when a
parent judicial over-reaching.”
court incorporates a cosmopolitan conception into its framework, it is
doing so as a local actor articulating a new (cosmopolitan) domestic
norm in a multinational dispute.
Cosmopolitanism thus offers courts an opportunity to craft choiceof-law rules that reflect the realities of a world where people form
multiple community affiliations that are not necessarily linked to
physical geography. By considering these multiple affiliations, courts
provide a forum for debate about the changing scope of prescriptive
jurisdiction. Such debate can actually promote long-term international cooperation by providing incentives for other branches of gov219
ernment to negotiate international regulatory compromises. And by
recognizing the long-term interests that states have in being part of an
interlocking world order, courts can engage in dynamic, transnational
lawmaking, developing and applying international, transnational, or
hybrid norms to govern multistate disputes.

217

Supra Part II.B.
Dinwoodie, supra note 160, at 577.
219
William Dodge sees this incentive as a reason to prefer interest analysis over
vested rights. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 105-06 (1998). He argues that
in a world of concurrent jurisdiction, there will be conflicts arising from parochial application of forum law and that these conflicts provide useful incentives to negotiate.
Id. at 106. A cosmopolitan approach offers similar benefits both because it permits
(and promotes) concurrent jurisdiction and because it raises the conflict-of-laws questions to the surface rather than simply assuming a forum law default.
218
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III. ARTICULATING A COSMOPOLITAN VISION
OF RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS
Just as with choice of law, a cosmopolitan vision of judgment recognition requires judges to see themselves as part of an international
network of courts and to see the parties before them as potentially affiliated with multiple communities. Those various communities might
legitimately seek to impose their norms on such affiliated parties.
Thus, when faced with an enforcement decision regarding a foreign
judgment, courts should not necessarily assume that their own local
public policies block such enforcement. Instead, courts must undertake a nuanced inquiry concerning whether the affiliations of the parties render the original court judgment legitimate. Although the local
policies of the forum country are not irrelevant, those policies should
be weighed against the overall systemic interest in creating an interlocking system of international adjudication.
This is not so different from what U.S. courts already do in domestic cases raising judgment recognition issues. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has long held that states cannot invoke public
220
This is true even
policy to refuse to enforce sister-state judgments.
when the judgment being enforced would be illegal if issued by the
221
rendering state.
Of course, in the domestic context, the recognition of judgments
has a constitutional dimension because of the Full Faith and Credit
222
Clause.
Moreover, within a single, relatively homogenous country,
the idea of one state enforcing another state’s judgment does not
seem quite so controversial because the legal variations among states
are likely to be relatively minor. On the other hand, the Full Faith
223
and Credit Clause derives from the Articles of Confederation, which
were drafted when the colonies were less homogenous and more akin
to separate nation-states than they are today.

220

See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (clarifying that
there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judgments).
221
See supra note 95.
222
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
223
The Articles of Confederation contained a provision similar to article IV, section 1: “Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts,
and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.” U.S.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. For a concise history of full faith and credit, see
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
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In any event, while the decision to enforce a foreign court’s judgment will surely be less automatic, many of the same principles are still
relevant. Most importantly, what we might call the “conflicts values”
that underlie the Full Faith and Credit command should be part of
the judgment recognition calculus. Thus, courts should acknowledge
the importance of participating in an interlocking international legal
system, where litigants cannot simply avoid unpleasant judgments by
relocating. Indeed, in a cosmopolitan world, there is no need for inherent suspicion of foreign judgments. As in the choice-of-law context, deference to other courts will have long-term reciprocal benefits.
And, particularly when the parties have no significant affiliation with
the forum state, there is little reason for a court to insist on following
domestic public policies in the face of such competing conflicts values.
This is not to say that foreign judgments should always be enforced. Even in a cosmopolitan system, one would expect that judges
might sometimes interpose local public policies where they would not
in the domestic state-to-state setting. But if we acknowledge the importance of the conflicts values effectuated by strong judgment recognition, we will necessarily reject the idea that, because a judgment
could not have been issued by a court in the first instance, that court
is simply unable to enforce the judgment. Instead, we will appreciate
that enforcing a foreign judgment is fundamentally different from issuing an original judgment. Indeed, judgment recognition implicates
an entirely distinct set of concerns about the role of courts in a multistate world.
In most areas of law, United States courts have generally invoked
these conflicts values and enforced foreign judgments as a matter of
224
225
comity. As far back as 1895, in Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear that comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
226
who are under the protection of its laws.” The Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws codified this idea, noting that a “judgment rendered in
a foreign nation . . . will, if valid, usually be given the same effect as a
224

See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 176 (2004)
(noting that, since the nineteenth century, “the United States has been at the vanguard of enforcing foreign judgments”).
225
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
226
Id. at 164.
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227

sister State judgment.” Moreover, validity is based only on whether
the court that rendered judgment had proper personal jurisdiction
over the parties and utilized procedures that were not inherently un228
fair.
In addition, while courts enforcing foreign judgments (as opposed to domestic ones) have applied a public policy exception to
avoid enforcing particularly egregious rulings, the exception has been
229
construed very narrowly. Accordingly, courts only refuse to enforce
“where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of
230
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”
Likewise, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act require that a U.S. court enforce a
judgment or arbitral award unless there is fraud or if doing so would
231
be repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing forum. Thus, in
most recognition of judgments cases, “[c]ourts consistently have enforced foreign judgments even if they would have refused to entertain
232
As Judge
suit on the original claim on grounds of public policy.”
Cardozo observed: “We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
233
home.”
In stark contrast to this general policy of respecting foreign judgments, however, U.S. courts generally have assumed, at least where
U.S. constitutional values seem to be at stake, that enforcing an “unconstitutional” judgment is itself a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
As a result, courts have effectively imposed U.S. constitutional norms
onto foreign disputes, even in circumstances where the dispute has lit234
tle connection with the United States.

227

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 117 cmt. c (1971).
Id. § 92.
229
See Rosen, supra note 224, at 177-79 (surveying U.S. case law on enforcement of
foreign judgments).
230
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 117 cmt. c (1971).
231
See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (requiring courts to enforce the judgment or
arbitral award unless there is fraud or if doing so would be repugnant to the public
policy of the enforcing forum); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
§ 4, 13 pt. II U.L.A. 58-59 (2002) (discussing situations where foreign judgments need
not be recognized).
232
Rosen, supra note 224, at 178-79.
233
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
234
For an insightful critique of this practice, see Rosen, supra note 224, at 227-32.
228
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Consider, for example, the case of Telnikoff v. Matusevitch. This
was a libel case between two British citizens concerning writings that
236
appeared in a British newspaper.
After a complicated sequence of
proceedings in the United Kingdom, a jury ruled for the plaintiff and
237
ordered damages, but Matusevitch moved to the state of Maryland
and subsequently sought a declaration that the British libel judgment
could not be enforced in the United States, pursuant to the First
238
The Maryland Supreme Court ultimately ruled that,
Amendment.
because British libel law violates the speech-protective First Amendment standards laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times
239
Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, the British judgment violated Mary240
land public policy and could not be enforced.
But there is no reason to think that the U.S. Constitution is necessarily implicated in such an enforcement action. First, it is debatable
whether the simple enforcement of a judgment creates the requisite
241
state action to implicate constitutional concerns.
Second, with re235

702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
See id. at 232-34 (summarizing the facts of the case).
237
See id. at 233-35 (detailing prior proceedings).
238
See id. at 235-36.
239
376 U.S. 254 (1964); see id. at 280 (holding that the First Amendment limits recovery for libel to false statements made with “actual malice—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
240
Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 249, 251.
241
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Equal Protection Clause precluded a court from enforcing a private, racially restrictive
covenant. In so doing, the Court determined that, although the covenant itself was
entered into by private actors who were not subject to the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, the action by the courts in enforcing the covenant was sufficient
state action to trigger constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 18-19. Shelley, therefore, appears to
block judicial enforcement of a private agreement (or a foreign order) that would be
unconstitutional. Indeed, courts, in refusing to enforce foreign “unconstitutional”
judgments, have explicitly relied on Shelley. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (N.D. Ca. 2001) (citing Shelley), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 399 F.3d
1010 (9th Cir. 2005). Since the time Shelley was issued, however, courts and commentators have backed away from the sweeping ramifications of Shelley. This is because, under Shelley’s reasoning, any private contract that is being enforced by a police officer or
court would be transformed into state action. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that Shelley’s approach, “consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the
security of potential judicial enforcement”). Although generations of legal realists and
critical legal studies scholars have articulated similarly sweeping conceptions of state
action, see Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of
Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1279-81
(2000) (surveying these critiques), courts have largely resisted Shelley and have limited
236
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gard to interstate harmony, a refusal to enforce the British libel judgment effectively imposes U.S. First Amendment norms on the United
Kingdom. Such parochialism in judgment recognition, as in choice of
law, is cause for concern. Third, while it is true that constitutional
considerations could conceivably generate sufficient public policy reasons to refuse to enforce a judgment, the libel dispute in Telnikoff did
not in any way implicate U.S. public policy because neither party had
any particular affiliation with the United States at the time of the
events at issue.
Thus, even if U.S. constitutional values or public policy considerations might sometimes require a court to refuse to enforce a judgment,
there is no basis for a categorical rule preventing enforcement, and
little reason to refuse to enforce an otherwise valid foreign judgment
absent significant ties between the dispute and the United States. Instead, courts should take seriously the conflicts values that would be
effectuated by enforcing the foreign judgment, weigh the importance
of such values against the relative importance of the local public policy or constitutional norm, and then consider the degree to which the
parties have affiliated themselves with the forum. Only then can
courts take into account the multistate character of the dispute and
the flexible nature of community affiliation in a cosmopolitan world.
IV. APPLYING THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION
A cosmopolitan approach to choice of law and recognition of
judgments yields a significantly different framework for analyzing the
cases discussed in Part I. Although the ultimate result does not
change in each instance, cosmopolitanism would affect the way in
which judges view their task in considering cases with multinational
242
dimensions. This Part therefore reconsiders each case in turn.

its holding only to the context of racially restrictive covenants. Even in cases implicating the First Amendment, “with virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the
judicial enforcement of private agreements inhibiting speech does not trigger constitutional review, despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on speech would
have.” Rosen, supra note 224, at 193; see also id. at 192-95 (discussing cases that have
addressed the judicial enforcement of private contracts). Thus, it is not clear how robust Shelley still is and whether it would truly pose a constitutional bar in an action to
enforce a foreign judgment. For further discussion of Shelley and its implications for
judgment recognition, see Rosen, supra note 224, at 186-209.
242
See supra Part I (introducing cases).

2005]

TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN VISION

1873

A. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com
Rather than simply insisting on applying U.S. law, a court with a
cosmopolitan vision of choice of law would ask whether the commu243
nity affiliations of the parties in GlobalSantaFe. made it more appropriate to apply the law of South Korea or the law of the United States
(or some combination of the two). At first glance, such an analysis
might seem to produce a draw. GlobalSantaFe is a U.S. corporation,
but Park is a South Korean citizen who did not even register the do244
Thus, even a tenuous,
main name in dispute with a U.S. registrar.
Internet-based contact with the United States is lacking.
Yet, relying on such literal “contacts” is a relic of territorialism
(even when the contact in question is simply “visiting” a U.S.-based
web server). Instead, a cosmopolitan vision looks to affiliation. Here,
Park purposely registered the domain name of a newly-formed U.S.
corporation, GlobalSantaFe, precisely because it was a newly formed
245
corporation. Accordingly, this is not a case where someone registers
a domain name for independent reasons, and the name just happens
to be the same as that of some distant entity that was likely unknown
to the registrant. Instead, Park was fully aware of the U.S. corporation
and deliberately picked the name to take advantage of the confusion
and then sell the name back to the corporation.
I will leave to others to discuss whether Park’s activity should be il246
legal, and whether anti-cybersquatting laws are a good idea or not. I
note only that Park’s actions were wholly aimed at a U.S. corporation
based in the United States. On that basis, it seems that a court using a
cosmopolitan perspective would apply U.S. trademark law to the dispute. Moreover, had the South Korean court adopted such a view, it
would have enforced the original U.S. court judgment rather than set
up a parochial battle of dueling injunctions. Indeed, if one viewed
this as a judgment recognition case, under a cosmopolitan vision the
South Korean court should first have acknowledged Park’s voluntary
affiliation with the United States and then enforced the U.S. court’s
judgment in order to avoid precisely the sort of judicial impasse that
occurred here. Such is the importance of conflicts values.

243

250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
See id. at 613 n.4 (noting that the domain name was registered in Korea).
245
See id. at 616 (finding that the registrant “clearly” registered the domain name
“after, and in response to” the merger announcement).
246
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
244
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Does that mean that the citizenship of the alleged trademark
holder should always govern the choice-of-law decision? Not necessarily. First, as noted above, if Park had registered the name without any
knowledge of, or intent to profit from, the U.S.-based corporate
name, there would be no voluntary affiliation with the United States.
Second, if GlobalSantaFe, even if incorporated in the United States,
were based in South Korea or conducted substantial activities there,
then South Korean trademark law might well apply since both parties
would have meaningful affiliations with South Korea.
Moreover, even though a cosmopolitan choice-of-law vision
reaches the same result as the district court in this particular case, it
would not support the district court’s notion that the location of the
registry company has any bearing at all on the choice-of-law deci247
Such a focus territorializes Internet transactions in a particusion.
larly arbitrary way, given that very few people know the whereabouts
of, or interact with, the registry for a top-level domain. And as a practical matter, emphasizing the physical location of the registry company
means that, for the foreseeable future, all domain name disputes (at
least those in the most popular “.com” or “.net” or “.edu” domains)
would be resolved under U.S. law. Such a system, while creating a certain degree of uniformity, is unacceptably parochial. Indeed, if in the
future we were to see the emergence of a popular top-level domain
whose registries were located outside the United States, there would
likely be substantial objection from U.S. trademark holders. Thus, a
system that privileges the arbitrary location of registry companies is an
invitation to long-term segmentation of the domain name system, with
different legal rules governing different top-level domains. A cosmopolitan vision, in contrast, though it may at times be less predictable,
at least holds the promise of developing long-term common law consensus about which nation’s laws should apply to which types of disputes.
B. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona
In contrast to GlobalSantaFe, the domain name dispute in Barce248
lona.com has far less connection to the United States. Here we have
a Spanish citizen registering a domain name using the name of a
247

See GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (relying on the fact that the registry
company was located within the district).
248
330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Spanish city to create a tourist portal for people visiting Spain.
While it is true that Nogueras, the registrant, subsequently transferred
the domain name to a nominally American corporation, the corporation appears to have been created solely to hold the registration and
has no actual presence in the United States beyond a domain name
250
registration and a post office box.
A cosmopolitan vision of choice of law need not countenance legal formalisms such as the place of incorporation. Rather, the inquiry
is focused on substantive community affiliations. Here, all the true
principals in the case are in Spain, and the dispute concerns a web
portal for tourists intending to visit Barcelona. These are indeed
strong affiliations with Spain.
Therefore, a cosmopolitan vision would embrace the approach of
the district court and at least use Spanish law to determine whether
the City of Barcelona held a valid trademark in names containing the
word Barcelona. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit panel applied U.S.
trademark law, on the theory that the Spanish law should not be ap251
plied extraterritorially.
When dealing with a globally interconnected communications system, however, the appellate court’s conception of extraterritoriality is problematic because there is no way to
avoid a ruling that will have some extraterritorial effect. The Fourth
Circuit focused on the specter of Spanish trademark law being applied
252
in a case involving a U.S. corporation (never mind the fact that the
corporation was only formally a U.S. entity). But the Fourth Circuit’s
approach is equally extraterritorial, because it applies U.S. trademark
law in a case involving a Spanish trademark holder, various Spanish
parties, and a web portal for tourists to Spain.
Accordingly, the mere fact that some country’s trademark law will
be applied extraterritorially does not provide any solution to the
choice-of-law problem. Indeed, it is precisely the existence of a reciprocal extraterritoriality problem that makes it a choice-of-law question
in the first place. Thus, relying on territoriality is no solution. Instead, the court should have delved deeper, using choice-of-law principles to analyze the substantive community affiliations of the par253
ties.
249

Id. at 620.
Id.
251
Id. at 626-28.
252
Id. at 628.
253
It is also worth noting that, at least in cases where both parties have a good-faith
connection to a name, the domain name could be “shared,” so that users typing in the
250
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Finally, although a discussion of how the insights of legal pluralism can inform conflict-of-laws is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is
worth noting that there is a third set of community norms in this case:
not just those of the United States and Spain, but also the norms articulated by the WIPO arbitrator in the first place. These norms are a
product of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) promulgated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
254
(ICANN). ICANN might be thought of as an Internet-based govern255
ing body, and arguably the U.S. court could have deferred to this
nonstate community affiliation. On the other hand, one might think
that ICANN lacks the democratic accountability necessary to be a le256
gitimate governing body and that any tie between a website operator

domain name would be shown an introductory screen giving them the choice of which
site they are seeking.
254
See Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 621 (“Every domain name issued by Network Solutions, Inc. is issued under a contract, the terms of which include a provision requiring resolution of disputes through the UDRP. In accordance with that policy, the City
Council filed an administrative complaint with . . . WIPO, an ICANN-authorized dispute-resolution provider located in Switzerland.”).
255
See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 20 (2000) (“For almost two years,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has been making domain name policy under contract with the Department of Commerce . . . .”);
David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, or Where Is James Madison When We Need Him? (June
1999), at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/icann/comment1.html (“[N]otwithstanding the [U.S.] government’s (and ICANN’s) protestations to the contrary,
this is about nothing less than Internet governance writ large.”). Indeed, at the press
conference convened in 1998 to unveil the Department of Commerce White Paper
that led to the creation of ICANN, Becky Burr, Department of Commerce spokeswoman, stated:
We are looking for a globally and functionally representative organization,
operated on the basis of sound and transparent processes that protect against
capture by self-interested factions, and that provides robust, professional
management. The new entity’s processes need to be fair, open, and procompetitive. And the new entity needs to have a mechanism for evolving to
reflect changes in the constituency of Internet stakeholders.
Press Release, Becky Burr, Associate Administrator, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration’s Office of International Affairs, Commerce Department
Releases Policy Statement on the Internet Domain Name System (June 5, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/dnsburr.htm.
256
For criticisms of ICANN from the perspective of democratic legitimacy and
administrative transparency, see, for example, Froomkin, supra note 255, at 18; Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 188 (2000); Post,
supra note 255. See generally Centre for Global Studies, Univ. of Vict., Enhancing Legitimacy in the Internet Corporation for Assigning Names and Numbers: Accountable and
Transparent Governance Structures (Sept. 18, 2002), at http://www.markle.org/
downloadable_assets/icann_enhancelegitemacy.pdf. For similar criticisms of WIPO,
see, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY
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and ICANN is largely involuntary and therefore not a cognizable
community affiliation. In any event, the existence of the WIPO arbitration in this case reminds us that nonstate entities may be an important source of norms and must at least be considered in any conflicts
analysis.
C. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Le Racisme Et L’Antisémitisme
258

Like Barcelona.com, the Yahoo! case also raises a reciprocal problem of extraterritoriality. Yahoo! argued that the French judgment
was an impermissible attempt by France to impose global rules for
259
Internet expression. Yet, if France is not able to block the access of
French citizens to proscribed material, then the United States will effectively be imposing First Amendment norms on the entire world.
Again, the issue of extraterritoriality is inescapable.
So, how does a court adopting a cosmopolitan framework approach the question of whether to recognize the French judgment?
TECH. L.J. 617, 618 (1999):
As an international body all too willing to take up the reins of global governance, WIPO attempted to create global e-commerce friendly rules by a process
that, left to itself, seemed likely to consist predominantly of meeting with
commercial interest groups and giving little more than lip service to privacy
and freedom of expression concerns.
For criticism of the UDRP system on the ground that the arbitration system is fundamentally biased in favor of trademark holders, see Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
903, 903-13 (2002) (noting that the system is biased in favor of trademark holders);
MICHAEL GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM? AN UPDATE ON BIAS ALLEGATIONS AND
THE ICANN UDRP 8 (2002), at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf (updating study, responding to methodological criticisms, and stating that bias continues).
All of these criticisms might be relevant in determining whether a court should consider or defer to norms articulated through the UDRP process.
257
As Michael Froomkin describes:
Anyone who wishes to have a domain name visible to the Internet at large
must acquire it from a registrar who has the right to inscribe names in an
ICANN-approved domain name registry. ICANN determines which registries
are authoritative. This power to make and break registries allows ICANN to
require registries (and also registrars) to promise to subject all registrants to a
mandatory third-party beneficiary clause in which every registrant agrees to
submit to ICANN’s UDRP upon the request of aggrieved third parties who believe they have a superior claim to the registrant’s domain name.
A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial)
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 612 (2002).
258
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Ca. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
259
Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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To begin, we must acknowledge that this is a difficult case. To the extent that local public policies should have any valence in an international judgment recognition decision, here the U.S. public policy is
particularly strong. Not only is the First Amendment a constitutional
command, but it goes to the heart of American self-identity and arguably helps to define American democracy. Moreover, unlike in the
260
Telnikoff case discussed above, Yahoo! is a U.S. corporation based in
the United States. Thus, Yahoo!’s entitlement to First Amendment
protection is far stronger than was Matusevitch’s.
On the other hand, in weighing the relevant conflicts values, it
becomes clear that this case is not merely a matter of France simply
imposing its norms on an entity with no affiliation in France. Rather,
261
as Joel Reidenberg has argued, Yahoo! is a sophisticated, multinational operator, with a business plan aimed at reaching web users
262
263
worldwide, a marketing strategy touting its “global footprint,” and
a French subsidiary in which it owns a seventy percent ownership
264
Indeed, Yahoo! exerted substantial control over this subsidistake.
ary, dictating some of the links and content of the French site and re265
quiring the subsidiary to maintain links to its U.S.-based site.
Moreover, Yahoo! routinely profiled French users in order to target
266
them with advertisements written in French.
Given these efforts to
take advantage of the French market and affiliate itself with France,
Yahoo! has less cause for complaint concerning France’s “extraterritorial” judgment.

260

Supra text accompanying notes 235-240.
Reidenberg, supra note 82, at 267.
262
See YAHOO! INC., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2000) [hereinafter YAHOO! 1999
ANNUAL REPORT] (“Yahoo! Inc. . . . is a global Internet communications, commerce
and media company that offers a comprehensive branded network of services to more
than 120 million users each month worldwide.”), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0000912057-00-014598-d1.html.
263
See Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Reports Fourth Quarter, Year End 2000
Financial Results (Jan. 10, 2001) (“Yahoo! remained committed to broadening its
global footprint and maintaining a leadership position worldwide.”), available at
http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/4q00pr.html.
264
YAHOO! 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 262, at 5.
265
See Yahoo! France License Agreement, art. 3 (1996), in YAHOO! INC., 1996
ANNUAL REPORT exhibit 10.33, at 141-61 (1997) (setting forth the terms of the licensing agreement between Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo! France), available at http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0000912057-97-011353.txt.
266
See T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/
cti/tgiparis20000522.htm (describing Yahoo!’s practice of profiling and targeting
French users).
261
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Thus, the Yahoo! case falls within two extremes. At one pole is
Telnikoff, in which the relevant community affiliations of both the parties and the dispute were exclusively British, and therefore enforcing
the British libel judgment would be appropriate. At the other pole is
a hypothetical case in which a small, local website based in the United
States is prosecuted in France solely because of material available on
its website. The company’s utter lack of community affiliation with
France would likely mean that the French judgment should not be
enforced in the United States. In that instance, the strong First
Amendment values would outweigh the need to enforce the judgment
in order for the recognition court to remain a cooperative member of
an international judicial community. In Yahoo!, there is both significant affiliation with the United States and significant affiliation with
France. In the end, under a cosmopolitan approach, I think that the
extent of Yahoo!’s business activities abroad justify the French judgment and should make it enforceable in the United States. But regardless of the final outcome, it is clear that courts could not simply
cite the First Amendment and refuse to enforce a foreign judgment
without actually considering the conflicts values implicated by the enforcement decision.
CONCLUSION
In a case decided in 2004, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
267
S.A., the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the Sherman Act extraterritorially to regulate alleged anticompetitive activity that took
place overseas, at least to the extent that the relevant harm was suffered by foreign plaintiffs. Although the applicable statutory provision was ambiguous concerning the appropriate extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, the Court refused to interpret the statute
to reach foreign anticompetitive conduct causing only foreign injury.
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, opined that, “if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have
tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legisla268
tive fiat.”
While the facts of Hoffman-La Roche are not necessarily analogous
269
to the three cases discussed in this Essay, the Court’s statement
267
268
269

124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
Id. at 2369.
The Barcelona.com case, however, is somewhat similar because in that case, as in
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about “legal imperialism” is nevertheless instructive. In a highly interdependent world, concerns about legal imperialism may be as significant as concerns about military, political, or cultural imperialism.
And while it is unrealistic (and perhaps unappealing) to expect international harmonization of legal norms, a cosmopolitan approach
would at least allow judges to evaluate multiple community affiliations
while developing choice-of-law rules as part of a joint transnational enterprise.
Conflicts analysis, of course, is one way in which courts and commentators attempt to create ordering principles for evaluating the intractable problems that arise in a world of transnational communication, commerce, and affiliation. Thus, the first step is for courts to
take this analysis seriously and actually use conflicts principles in cases
raising multistate concerns. Instead of simply applying a domestic law
to a transnational dispute, courts must analyze the degree to which
that domestic law should be applied to the dispute. Indeed, regardless
of the precise rubric used for resolving conflicts cases, the initial point
is that courts cannot avoid at least considering the conflicts values that
are potentially implicated. Otherwise, we risk creating a completely
segmented international legal system, whereby jurisdictions compete
to apply their laws extraterritorially with no limits and no analysis.
In addition, the particular rubric for deciding conflicts cases matters. This is because, at root level, conflicts rules reflect our changing
definitions of community affiliation. The conflicts analysis always asks:
when is it legitimate for one community to impose its norms on a dispute with links to other communities? Thus, conflict of laws is a terrain of engagement, where the crucial problems of globalization must
be worked out over time.
In an era of global interaction—with its rapid movement of people, money, ideas, goods, and services—a conflicts jurisprudence
based solely on the territorial location of key events is unduly limited
and cannot hope to capture the variety of nonterritorial affiliations
people and corporations actually form. Likewise, conflicts rules based
on parochial preferences for forum law are apt to turn into legal imperialism unless one’s idea of a government’s self-interest is expanded
to include an interest in being a cooperating member of the global
community. And though it makes sense to allow courts more freedom
to craft common law compromises in multistate cases, the question of

Hoffman-La Roche, the actors and nearly all the significant actions took place outside
the United States.
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community affiliation is too important to be folded into the substantive legal issues without separate analysis. Finally, in determining
whether to recognize foreign judgments, courts must take into account that parties with foreign affiliations might appropriately be subject to foreign court decisions even if such judgments do not accord
with U.S. law or public policy. Thus, courts seeing themselves as part
of an interlocking world system cannot simply assume that local preferences necessarily prevail.
A cosmopolitan vision of conflict of laws aims to respond to these
imperatives. By focusing on community affiliation rather than territoriality, cosmopolitanism attempts to turn the legal gaze to the reality
of global interaction rather than simply the formal contacts with a
geographical location. Moreover, given such multiple community affiliations, there is no reason to privilege forum law. Rather, cosmopolitanism recognizes, as many scholars of law and globalization have,
that we do not live in a world where states can effectively pursue their
own short-term self-interest with single-minded devotion. Because
states are inevitably embedded in an international system, they internalize the aspirations and disciplining norms of that international system and have an important interest in being a cooperative member of
a global community. Yet, given that it is both practically unlikely and
normatively undesirable to create a single overarching global law,
courts must engage in an ongoing, nuanced discussion of conflict-oflaws principles in order to accommodate both the particularities of
each community and the need to regulate multiple communities effectively. Such nuanced analysis will consider community affiliation,
the functional needs of the transnational system, and the possibility of
developing hybrid norms for cases that touch multiple normative
communities. And, in considering judgments issued by courts abroad,
judges must analyze the importance of long-term conflicts values and
not just reflexively rely on local norms.
There is much more work to be done, of course, to develop stable
legal principles concerning how best to calibrate community affiliation for the purpose of resolving difficult conflict-of-laws cases. Part of
the point of a cosmopolitan approach, however, is to allow transna270
tional adjudication (and possibly diplomacy) to work out conflicts
norms over time. Only through ongoing discussion of how to analyze
community affiliation in a global era will a truly transnational legal sys270

See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 219, at 106 (arguing that a choice of law system that
acknowledges multiple concurrent jurisdiction may help spur international harmonization efforts by other branches of government).
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tem be born. Finally, though this Essay has focused on norms embodied by official state-sanctioned entities, a comprehensive analysis of
conflict of laws embraces the insights of legal pluralism and considers
nonstate norm-generating communities, as well as the degree to which
those norms should be analyzed for their persuasive power in conflicts
settings.
Nevertheless, for now it is enough simply to move the discussion
towards a different set of criteria for analyzing transnational conflicts
questions. By acknowledging multiple community affiliations and a
broader set of state interests, we are less likely to engage in legal imperialism and more likely to consider the ways in which all states inevitably have a stake in a functioning transnational system. As in Young’s
271
account of the “unoppressive city,” we must consider a conflicts approach that permits “unassimilated otherness,” while still emphasizing
cooperation, accommodation, and global interaction. And though we
are unlikely ever to attain such a lofty set of goals, we can at least take
an important step by adopting legal rules that seriously engage the increasingly cosmopolitan world in which we live.

271

Young, supra note 183, at 317.

